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The Mobility Case for Regionalism 
Nestor M. Davidson†* & Sheila R. Foster** 
In the discourse of local government law, the idea that a mobile 
populace can “vote with its feet” has long served as a justification for 
devolution and decentralization. Tracing to Charles Tiebout’s seminal 
work in public finance, the legal-structural prescription that follows is 
that a diversity of independent and empowered local governments can best 
satisfy the varied preferences of residents metaphorically shopping for 
bundles of public services, regulatory environment, and tax burden. 
This localist paradigm generally presumes that fragmented governments 
are competing for residents within a given metropolitan area. 
Contemporary patterns of mobility, however, call into question this 
foundational assumption. People today move between — and not just 
within — metropolitan regions, domestically and even internationally. 
This is particularly so for a subset of residents — high human-capital 
knowledge workers and the so-called “creative class” — that is 
prominently coveted in this interregional competition. These modern 
mobile residents tend to evaluate the policy bundles that drive their 
locational decisions on a regional scale, weighing the comparative merits 
of metropolitan areas against each other. And local governments are 
increasingly recognizing that they need to work together at a regional 
scale to compete for these residents. 
This Article argues that this intermetropolitan mobility provides a novel 
justification for regionalism that counterbalances the strong localist 
tendency of the traditional Tieboutian view of local governance. Contrary 
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to the predominant assumption in the legal literature, competition for 
mobile residents is as much an argument for regionalism as it has been for 
devolution and decentralization. In an era of global cities vying for talent, 
the mobility case for regionalism has significant doctrinal consequences 
for debates in local government law and public finance, including the 
scope of local authority, the nature of regional equity, and the structure of 
metropolitan collaboration. 
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INTRODUCTION 
A foundational concept in the discourse of local government law — 
and federalism more broadly — is that a mobile populace will tend to 
move to places that best reflect their preferences for the proffered mix 
of local government services, regulatory environment, and tax burden. 
This idea, which traces back to Charles Tiebout’s influential 1956 
article on public finance, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures,1 is 
regularly invoked by legal scholars to argue for devolving authority to 
decentralized local governments. In a quasi-marketplace of 
metropolitan governance, the theory holds, a relatively greater variety 
of local governments will tend to match better the preferences of what 
Tiebout called “consumer-voters.”2 Local governments should thus be 
empowered with relatively robust legal autonomy and even free to 
secede from their metropolitan region.3 
This model of residential sorting and its legal-structural implications 
are predicated on a particular conception of mobility. On the demand 
side of Tiebout’s metaphorical marketplace, people choose among 
residential options in a given metropolitan area by evaluating the 
bundle of public goods offered at the local level. Correspondingly, the 
type of government the model contemplates to supply this targeted 
bundle is paradigmatically a local government of general jurisdiction.4 
 
 1 Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 
(1956). 
 2 Id. at 417-18. For an overview of the reception of mobility theory in local government 
legal scholarship, see Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II — Localism and Legal Theory, 
90 COLUM. L. REV. 346, 399-435 (1989) [hereinafter Our Localism]. For Tiebout’s influence 
on the broader discourse of federalism, see Todd E. Pettys, The Mobility Paradox, 92 GEO. 
L.J. 481, 481 (2003) (“Nearly half a century ago, in an article spanning a mere nine pages, 
Charles Tiebout revolutionized the way many think about American federalism.”). 
 3 See David Schleicher, The City as a Law Economic Subject, 2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 
1507, 1508-09 (2010) (“The normative takeaway from the Tiebout model literature is 
clear: metropolitan regions should be divided into many local governments that are 
free to provide local public services in an unrestricted way.”); see also Richard 
Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. 
REV. 1115, 1124 (1996) [hereinafter The Local Government] (observing that the 
Tiebout model assumes that a “multiplicity of localities” will “enhanc[e] the 
likelihood that one locality will approximate the mobile ‘consumer-voter’s’ 
preferences”). 
 4 See discussion infra Part I.A. As discussed below, Tiebout’s hypothesis was 
about not only a quasi-market mechanism for the efficient provision of local public 
goods, but also about the scale at which those public goods should be provided. See 
infra text accompanying notes 39-41. In essence, one of Tiebout’s assumptions was 
that there was an optimally efficient community size, and one aspect of Tiebout 
sorting on the supply side would be local governments’ desire to attract residents to 
reach that optimal size.  
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In short, Tieboutian localism depends on local governments 
competing for mobile residents in a defined metro area.5 
The competition for mobile residents, however, is quite different 
now than it might have appeared to Tiebout in the mid-1950s. Today, 
when many people move, they are choosing — at least at certain 
critical junctures in their lives — not among local governments in a 
single metropolitan area, but among different regions altogether.6 
College graduates, entrepreneurs starting new companies, employees 
in technology or finance, and other people who have the resources to 
relocate are no longer limited to one metro region. Instead, they are as 
likely to weigh moving to greater New York versus the San Francisco 
Bay Area, or even London or Beijing, as they are to be deciding 
whether to live in Denver versus Boulder or Cass Corridor in 
downtown Detroit versus Grosse Pointe.7 
There is evidence — primarily from the literature on human capital 
— that these interregional movers are making their locational choices 
based, in some measure, on comparing bundles of regional-scale 
public goods.8 Scholars have long identified regional job and housing 
 
 5 See Wallace E. Oates, The Many Faces of the Tiebout Model, in THE TIEBOUT 
MODEL AT FIFTY: ESSAYS IN PUBLIC ECONOMICS IN HONOR OF WALLACE OATES 35 (2006) 
[hereinafter TIEBOUT AT FIFTY] (noting that “[t]he conventional wisdom is that Tiebout 
sorting is most likely in a metropolitan setting where an individual who works in the 
center city (or elsewhere in the area) will have a wide choice among communities in 
which to live”). 
 6 By some estimates, roughly 16 percent of the U.S. population has moved across 
metropolitan area boundaries in the last five years, despite this being a period of 
relatively low overall mobility as a result of the current economic downturn. See 
discussion infra Part III.A. 
 7 This Article focuses on regionalism at the metropolitan scale, recognizing that 
definitions of what might constitute a “region” vary significantly. Other scales of 
governance — notably state and federal — can be relevant, but this Article is 
concerned primarily with local governments and metropolitan regions. 
 8 Many movers who are choosing between metropolitan regions are relatively 
better educated, higher skilled, and more attuned to the information economy. 
Richard Florida famously called this segment of the populace the “Creative Class.” See 
RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 8 (2002) [hereinafter FLORIDA, 
RISE]; see also RICHARD FLORIDA, CITIES AND THE CREATIVE CLASS 34 (2004) [hereinafter 
FLORIDA, CITIES]; RICHARD FLORIDA, THE FLIGHT OF THE CREATIVE CLASS 5-8 (2007). 
This description has drawn a fair share of criticism. See, e.g., Ann Markusen, Urban 
Development and the Politics of a Creative Class: Evidence from the Study of Artists, 38 
ENV’T & PLAN. A 1921, 1924 (2006) (challenging the purported causal link between 
creative classes and high-tech industry clusters). See generally Jamie Peck, Struggling 
with the Creative Class, 29 INT’L J. URB. & REG. RES. 740 (2005) (arguing that creative 
class strategies have little real impact on “urban policy orthodoxies” and may even 
entrench urban inequalities). But this description does capture the essence of people 
involved in “design, education, arts, music and entertainment, whose economic 
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markets, and natural amenities, as drivers of regional growth. 
Increasingly, however, regional mobility is animated by the kinds of 
amenities — a variety of public goods among them — that are 
supplied at a regional level. When a recent college engineering 
graduate is deciding where to locate, she is apt to think as much about 
regional job and housing markets as she is about any given set of local 
conditions.9 And the broad-scale infrastructure that supports an 
attractive metro-level knowledge and innovation ecosystem, such as 
universities, medical centers, and cultural institutions, can require the 
critical mass only available at a regional scale.10 
Not surprisingly, local governments competing for economic growth 
in a knowledge-based economy — all the more so in the aftermath of 
the global financial crisis — are increasingly responding to the 
preferences of this segment of the mobile populace.11 Competition 
 
function is to create new ideas, new technology and/or creative content.” FLORIDA, 
RISE, supra at 8. 
 9 This is not to argue that knowledge workers are the only interregional movers. 
Intermetropolitan mobility involves an array of movers, including retirees and 
workers in traditional economic sectors. See discussion infra Part II.A. That said, 
people associated with “high human capital” seem to play an outsized role in the 
contemporary public dialogue about interregional mobility. 
 10 Separating those aspects of why and where people choose to move that relate to 
governance from those aspects that focus on other aspects of locational choice is a 
difficult task, given that public goods can influence other motivations. The literature 
on mobility suggests a variety of explanations for the relative importance of various 
factors, including the advantages of proximity to other people — what economists call 
“agglomeration” — but the Tiebout model assumes that the preferences of marginal 
movers for public goods is a meaningful aspect of locational choice (and meaningfully 
influences governance). This Article accordingly begins with the same assumption. See 
discussion infra Part II.B. 
 11 See, e.g., Jennifer Collins, Detroit Pushes Back with Young Muscles, N.Y. TIMES (July 
3, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/fashion/the-young-and-entrepreneurial-
move-to-downtown-detroit-pushing-its-economic-recovery.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 
(“Detroit’s revival is also being attributed to the city’s ‘15 by 15’ initiative, started in 
2008. With a goal of getting 15,000 young talented households to downtown by 2015, 
government workers, entrepreneurs, philanthropists, business leaders and individuals, 
along with nonprofit groups, have been working to entice the 94 percent of college 
graduates who initially migrate to cities, according to recent census figures.”); see also 
COLUMBUS COLLEGE OF ART & DESIGN, CREATIVE COLUMBUS: A PICTURE OF THE CREATIVE 
ECONOMY OF CENTRAL OHIO 6-3 (2009), available at http://www.ccad.edu/files/about-
ccad/communications/ccfullreport.pdf (describing efforts to nurture the “creative 
economy” of the Columbus region to attract “young professionals or creative talent”); 
How Now Brown Town: A Former Steel City Is Now Proclaiming Its Cleaner Land and 
Clever Minds, THE ECONOMIST (Sept. 14, 2006), http://www.economist.com/ 
node/7914950 (describing Pittsburgh’s efforts to clean up industrial land for uses that 
suit the modern economy in an effort to attract creative or knowledge-intensive workers 
and firms). 
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between metro areas now spurs calls for investment in a variety of 
regional institutions and amenities.12 Indeed, there is a frequent refrain 
in current discussions of local economic development that captures 
the animating principle behind this dynamic precisely: “capital follows 
talent.”13 And attracting talent is increasingly a regional undertaking. 
This competition for interregional mobile residents, and particularly 
for “high human capital” movers who value regional amenities, has 
important consequences for the structure of metropolitan governance. 
The same confluence of demand for particular bundles of public goods 
and the ability of fragmented local governments to supply them that 
has been at the heart of the Tieboutian argument for localism can be 
inverted in the context of interregional mobility. Interregional 
mobility that creates competitive demand for regional-scale public 
goods justifies empowering the regional-scale supply of those public 
goods. Simply put, just as traditional intraregional mobility supports 
devolution, the need to compete in a marketplace of interregional 
consumer-voters creates a mobility case for regional governance.14 
This new normative justification for regionalism has clear legal-
structural consequences. Just as legal scholars have invoked the 
traditional Tiebout paradigm to undergird decentralization, 
 
 12 See, e.g., JONATHAN ROTHWELL ET AL., PATENTING PROSPERITY: INVENTION AND 
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN THE UNITED STATES AND ITS METROPOLITAN AREA 36 (2013), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Research/Files/Reports/2013/02/patenting% 
20prosperity%20rothwell/patenting%20prosperity%20rothwell.pdf (discussing how 
mayors and governors have started investing in higher education and research to 
encourage regional goals and industry). 
 13 See, e.g., Michael Bloomberg, Cities Must be Cool, Creative and In Control, FIN. TIMES 
(Mar. 27, 2012), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c09235b6-72ac-11e1-ae73-00144feab49a.html 
#axzz2dXxg6XZ9 (“I have long believed that talent attracts capital far more effectively and 
consistently than capital attracts talent. The most creative individuals want to live in places 
that protect personal freedoms, prize diversity and offer an abundance of cultural 
opportunities. A city that wants to attract creators must offer a fertile breeding ground for 
new ideas and innovations.”). This view up-ends the traditional focus of much local 
economic development on capturing factories and other hard capital investments to then 
attract or support human capital. 
 14 The majority of actual residential moves in any given year are still made by 
people within given metropolitan regions. See discussion infra Part II.A. But Tiebout 
was proposing a market mechanism for the efficient allocation of public goods, which 
assumes that the preferences of the marginal consumer will predominate. Accordingly, 
the types of high human capital interregional movers who have a broad array of 
locational options are likely to be more salient in that quasi-marketplace. This cross-
metropolitan mobility, domestically and internationally, gives these mobile residents 
an outsized role in demanding governance that corresponds to their sensitivity to 
regional public goods. This regional perspective thus adds a significant centrifugal 
counterweight to the overwhelming centripetal force that intraregional mobility has 
exerted in arguments for local governance. 
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interregional mobility can correspondingly bolster doctrinal and 
legislative support for regionalism. This does not mean that any 
particular regional institution or mechanism will necessarily respond 
best to regional-scale demand — consolidation, inter-local 
cooperation, or a host of other governance structures might be 
appropriate.15 But it does suggest that the law should facilitate the 
ability of savvy “suppliers” to follow where that demand leads. Thus, 
in core areas of local government law such as land use, education, 
taxation, and other local functions, interregional competition justifies 
state-level legislative efforts to promote regionalism. It also bolsters 
judicial recognition of the necessity, in some contexts, of ceding local 
authority to regional concerns. Likewise, municipal annexation and 
dissolution might be facilitated legislatively and doctrinally, and there 
might correspondingly be need for greater caution when it comes to 
the relative ease of municipal secession and incorporation. 
It bears noting at the outset that the Tiebout model has long been 
criticized for the distributional consequences of local residential 
sorting and the paradigm’s tendency to commodify governance.16 A 
regionalist version of the model does not necessarily mitigate these 
critiques, and in some respects may exacerbate them. Thus, it is 
possible — and there is some evidence to support this — that the 
spatial distributional problems that intraregional sorting generates are 
simply being replicated at a larger scale.17 Likewise, the effort, energy, 
and focus that local governments at a regional scale might put into 
policies targeting mobile members of the information economy are 
arguably just a variation of the kind of governance-as-marketplace that 
has concerned so many scholars about Tiebout’s influence. That said, 
regional mobility’s counterbalance to the devolutionary tendencies of 
the traditional paradigm might mitigate distributional concerns within 
 
 15 See Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, Self-Interest, and the Tyranny of the Favored 
Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New Regionalism, 88 GEO. L.J. 1985, 2028 (2000) 
(discussing “new regionalism” as “any attempt to develop regional governance 
structures or interlocal cooperative arrangements that better distribute regional 
benefits and burdens”); see also H. V. Savitch & Ronald K. Vogel, Paths to New 
Regionalism, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T. REV. 158, 161 (2000) (contrasting governmental 
approaches to regionalism through formal institutional mechanisms with 
“governance” approaches that recognize that “existing institutions can be harnessed in 
new ways”). 
 16 See discussion infra Part I.B. The Tiebout model has also been criticized for the 
practical policy consequences of metropolitan fragmentation and devolution’s 
tendency to exacerbate local externalities problems, among other concerns. 
 17 See infra text accompanying notes 209-11. 
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regions and could promote public investments that, by recognizing 
shared regional fate, pose less threat to community.18 
In sum, mobility is almost always associated with structural 
fragmentation and strong localism in the discourse of local 
government law. Despite the limitations of the Tiebout model’s 
admittedly simplifying assumptions,19 and sustained criticism of its 
consequences, the paradigm retains a great deal of intuitive appeal 
because it seems to capture an important element of local 
governance.20 But the legal literature on localism that has relied on the 
Tiebout model fails to acknowledge sufficiently that the scale of 
locational choice implicates the scale of governance. If metropolitan 
regions are increasingly competing against each other for residents 
who choose their location in many respects based on regional-scale 
public goods, then the appropriate scale of governance is regional.21 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains the traditional 
Tiebout model and canvasses its reception in legal literature. It then 
outlines recurring critiques of the influence of residential sorting as an 
argument for localism. Part II turns to the empirics of interregional 
mobility and alternative conceptions of the role that mobility might 
play in the scale of local governance. The conceptions contrast the 
 
 18 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 19 See discussion infra Part I.B.1. 
 20 The existence of Tiebout sorting at the local government level has a fair amount 
of empirical support. See, e.g., Vicki Been, “Exit” as a Constraint on Land Use Exactions: 
Rethinking the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 473, 521-23 
(1991) (summarizing much of the evidence); Keith Dowding, Peter John & Stephen 
Biggs, Tiebout: A Survey of the Empirical Literature, 31 URB. STUD. 767, 775-79 (1994) 
(surveying over 200 articles on empirical tests of Tiebout sorting). But see William W. 
Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, The New Economics of Jurisdictional Competition: 
Devolutionary Federalism in a Second-Best World, 86 GEO. L.J. 201, 239-43 (1997) 
(arguing that while the studies, taken together, support the demand side of the 
Tiebout model, they fail to directly support the supply side assertion that local 
government actors actively compete for residents with tax/public goods packages). For 
a general survey of the broader evidence of intergovernmental competition beyond the 
context of residential mobility, see Albert Bretton, The Existence and Stability of 
Interjurisdictional Competition, in COMPETITION AMONG STATES AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 37, 38-48 (Daphne A. 
Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991). 
 21 The fact that metropolitan regions increasingly compete at a regional scale has 
been recognized in the legal literature. See, e.g., Richard Briffault, Beyond City and 
Suburb: Thinking Regionally, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 203, 205 (2006) [hereinafter 
Beyond City and Suburb] (discussing regional governance as a strategy to improve 
economic competitiveness in a global economy where metropolitan regions are the 
“units of economic competition”). But the dynamics and implications of the link 
between interregional residential mobility and the legal structure of local governance 
have not been sufficiently explored. 
  
2013] The Mobility Case for Regionalism 71 
types of movers that local governments court in the modern economy 
as well as the interests that drive those movers’ locational decisions. 
Part III, in turn, argues that this interregional perspective on 
residential mobility generates a conceptual and practical 
counterweight to the devolutionary tendency of the traditional 
Tieboutian paradigm. It then explores the implications of this 
counterweight for the doctrine of regionalism. Finally, the Part revisits 
critiques of sorting and suggests avenues for further research on 
mobility in an era of global cities. 
I. RESIDENTIAL MOBILITY AND DEVOLUTION IN LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
As noted, an important concept in the local government legal 
literature derives from the Tiebout model of local governance as a 
quasi-market for mobile residents. This Part explains the underlying 
paradigm, explores how legal scholars have invoked it to justify 
localism, and then outlines the primary critiques of this devolutionary 
argument.22 
A. Tiebout’s Legal-Structural Consequences 
In his A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, Charles Tiebout set out to 
solve the basic problem in public finance of how to get the public to 
reveal its preferences for public goods.23 Paul Samuelson famously 
 
 22 In the legal literature, as in economics, tropes of interjurisdictional competition 
are also invoked for a variety of non-devolutionary arguments, such as the discipline 
of exit as a constraint on governmental rent seeking. See, e.g., Been, supra note 20, at 
478 (noting that various bodies of law assume that interjurisdictional competition 
would provide sufficient constraints to state and local government from 
overreaching); Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Of Property and Federalism, 
115 YALE L.J. 72 (2005) (contending that interjurisdictional competition produces 
efficient law); see also Pettys, supra note 2, at 484-87 (canvassing the broad array of 
topics on which arguments about interjurisdictional competition have been deployed). 
This Article does not engage directly with this larger discourse on the intersection of 
mobility and governance, instead focusing on mobility’s consequences for governance 
scale. 
 23 See generally William A. Fischel, An Introduction to the Tiebout Anniversary 
Essays, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY, supra note 5. The Tieboutian paradigm is only one 
example of a set of rational-choice explanations for local government behavior. 
Another approach argues that local governments, rather than competing for the 
marginal mobile resident, will set the level of public goods in a way that seeks to 
maximize the utility of the median voter. A contemporary example of this view can be 
found in William Fischel’s argument that because many households hold a large 
proportion of their wealth in homeownership, and the asset value of the home reflects 
the bundle of local public goods and taxes, local governments will tend to be 
particularly sensitive to these “homevoters.” WILLIAM FISCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER 
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argued that there was no decentralized pricing mechanism through 
which collective preferences for public goods (which he called 
“collective consumption goods”) could be revealed.24 The problem of 
free riding, Samuelson argued, would tend to cause people to signal 
less interest in public goods than they would under competitive 
conditions.25 
Tiebout responded, however, that a way exists to get individuals to 
reveal their preferences for public goods, at least on certain 
simplifying assumptions. If residents can choose among a variety of 
local jurisdictions that each offer a distinctive bundle of taxation, 
spending, and regulatory environments, then those consumer-voters 
could metaphorically shop by relocating.26 People would thus reveal 
their preferences for a given level of output of public goods by 
choosing the jurisdiction that best fit their preferences.27 In this way, 
the possibility of entrance (and, of course, exit) creates a kind of 
market for public goods and, assuming a sufficient variety of 
 
HYPOTHESIS: HOW HOME VALUES INFLUENCE LOCAL GOVERNMENT TAXATION, SCHOOL 
FINANCE, AND LAND-USE POLICIES 96-98 (2005). A third approach in this vein 
emphasizes the public-choice imperatives of local officials seeking to maximize their 
preferences, particularly around expenditures. See, e.g., William A. Niskanen, The 
Peculiar Economics of Bureaucracy, 58 AM. ECON. REV. 293 (1968) (setting forth a 
model for government expenditures informed by demand conditions). 
 24 Paul A. Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & 
STAT. 387, 388 (1954). Tiebout was also responding to Richard Musgrave’s similar 
argument that there was, as Tiebout put it, “no ‘market type’ solution” to determine 
the optimal level of public goods. Tiebout, supra note 1, at 416.  
 25 Samuelson, supra note 24, at 388. 
 26 See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 418. 
 27 It is almost obligatory in articles about Tiebout to attempt a definition of the 
notoriously tricky concept of “public goods,” most of which repeat the basic 
proposition that such goods (in the sense economists use the term) are non-
excludable and non-rivalrous. See, e.g., Aaron J. Saiger, Local Government Without 
Tiebout, 41 URB. LAW. 93, 94 n.1 (2009) (citing ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. 
RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 665-66 (6th ed. 2005)). This certainly makes sense as far 
as it goes. As the Tiebout hypothesis has filtered into the legal literature, however, 
strict definitions of public goods have become less important, given that the efficiency 
of the sorting mechanism is thought to apply to almost any kind of preference for 
public policies. See, e.g., Anup Malani, Valuing Laws as Local Amenities, 121 HARV. L. 
REV. 1273 (2008) (positing that local laws can be an amenity that influences locational 
decisions); Christopher Serkin, Local Property Law: Adjusting the Scales of Property 
Protection, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 883, 898-903 (2007) (arguing for a Tieboutian 
mechanism of sorting responsive to varying levels of local government protection for 
property rights); see also Nicole Stelle Garnett, The People Paradox, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 
43, 65 (2012) (describing “safety” as a public good in the context of Tiebout sorting). 
It is this broader sense of the work of local governments — the mix of public services, 
regulatory environment, and tax burden — that this Article deploys.  
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locational choices and a lack of constraints on mobility, the public 
resource allocation that results from this sorting process should tend 
to be efficient.28 
Tiebout was primarily concerned with mechanisms for setting the 
optimal supply of public goods.29 As Roderick Hills has pointed out, 
however, the Tiebout model is most often invoked in the legal 
literature to assess horizontal and vertical divisions of authority 
among various levels of government.30 In particular, scholars regularly 
invoke the Tiebout model to support arguments for devolution and 
decentralization.31 This argument is fairly straightforward, focusing on 
 
 28 See Oates, supra note 5, at 23 (Tiebout “tries to establish a kind of equivalence 
between the local public sector and a competitive market so that he can invoke the 
various properties of a competitive equilibrium to show that local finance induces 
individuals to reveal their preferences for local public goods and does so in such a way 
as to promote an efficient use of resources”). Tiebout was focused on allocative 
efficiency (how close are the outputs of local governments approximating consumer-
voter preferences), but the distinct question of productive efficiency (how much 
output comes from a given input) is often raised in discussions of mobility and 
metropolitan fragmentation. See Keith Dowling & Thanos Mergoupis, Fragmentation, 
Fiscal Mobility, and Efficiency, 65 J. POL. 1190, 1190 (2003). 
 29 Since the Tiebout hypothesis began to gain traction through the work of 
Wallace Oates, scholars have debated whether Tiebout was concerned only with 
preference revelation, or was also interested directly in decentralization. See Oates, 
supra note 5, at 22 (citing Paul Seabright’s argument that Tiebout’s model was not 
“saying anything about the decentralization of power in government”). Oates has 
argued that decentralization is still efficiency-enhancing even in the absence of 
sorting. See generally WALLACE E. OATES, THE DECENTRALIZATION THEOREM (1972). 
 30 See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Compared to What? Tiebout and the Comparative 
Merits of Congress and the States in Constitutional Federalism, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY, supra 
note 5, at 239, 240.  
 31 The proliferation of structural prescriptions associated with Tieboutian localism 
is akin to the outgrowth of a kind of normative Coaseanism that is arguably removed 
from Ronald Coase’s actual work — what Robert Ellickson contrasted as the 
cardboard Coase and the real Coase. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Case for Coase and 
Against “Coaseanism,” 99 YALE L.J. 611, 612-13 (1989). We do not mean to create a 
cardboard (localist) Tiebout here, but rather highlight the frequent invocation of 
Tieboutian sorting as an argument in the legal literature for fragmentation and local 
empowerment. 
Interestingly, Tiebout himself may have been more open to regionalism than the 
devolutionary reception his market-based theory of local governments would suggest. 
In a 1961 article he co-authored with Vincent Ostrom and Robert Warren, Tiebout 
argued that market discipline for determining the level of public goods was only 
appropriate “for those public goods which are internalized within the boundaries of a 
given political jurisdiction.” Vincent Ostrom et al., The Organization of Government in 
Metropolitan Areas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 838 (1961). For 
many other public services, Tiebout, Ostrom, and Warren argued that a more 
appropriate scale might be what they described as the polycentric political system at 
the metropolitan level. Id. at 838-42 (arguing that metropolitan areas operate for many 
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local governments of general jurisdiction as the suppliers of public 
goods within the Tieboutian quasi-market.32 The legal-structural 
prescription from the supply side is that metropolitan regions should 
have relatively more of these jurisdictions with relatively greater local 
autonomy to facilitate “consumer” choice.33 This means that it should 
be relatively easier for communities to form local governments or 
secede from larger governmental units. It also means that, all things 
being equal, these fragmented localities should enjoy more legal 
authority — through home rule, preemption, scope of delegation, and 
other doctrines — to carve out their own niches in the metropolitan 
marketplace.34 
 
public services in a rich and intricate framework of intraregional cooperation and 
negotiation, and using that as a frame against which to compare more localized public 
goods). 
 32 The influence of mobility on local governments emerges in very different ways 
depending on the kind of mobile “asset” that is at issue. Tiebout focused on residential 
mobility, but other scholars have applied the idea of interjurisdictional competition to 
capital investment decisions, regulatory environments, fungible capital, and other 
fluid “resources.” See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: 
Rethinking the “Race-to-the-Bottom” Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992) (discussing the impact of regulatory environments on 
interjurisdictional competition). Moreover, paradigms of entrance and exit and their 
influence on the output of public goods play out in very different ways depending on 
the particular type of fluid resource at issue — residents, capital investments, new 
industry, mobile capital — even if the idea of competition for mobile residents tends 
to collapse into a more general proposition that any kind of mobile resource might be 
subject to this kind of competition. See, e.g., Been, supra note 20, at 478 (arguing that 
interlocal competition for development will serve as a check on local protectionism); 
Serkin, supra note 27, at 886 (describing a real-estate-developer-oriented view of 
Tieboutian competition and noting that developers “often choose among a package of 
incentives offered, or fees demanded, by competing municipalities, depending on the 
desirability of the development and the costs and benefits it is expected to create”). 
This Article’s discussion of interregional mobility follows Tiebout’s lead by focusing 
on the particular confluence of governance and residential mobility.  
 33 See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1508-09 (summarizing this proposition). 
 34 The idea that mobility supports devolution has been applied in the broader 
discourse of federalism as one way of supporting arguments for relatively greater 
recognition of state-level interests over federal authority. See, e.g., Hills, supra note 30. 
Despite its prominence, a devolutionary prescription is by no means the only logical 
conclusion to be reached from the Tiebout paradigm. Todd Pettys has offered the 
intriguing counterargument in the national context — which is theoretically 
applicable at any intermediate scale — that one ironic consequence of mobility may be 
that it creates incentives for consumer-voters to seek federal policy on issues of their 
preference. To Pettys, mobile citizens might want uniform, or favorable, regulatory 
conditions no matter where they may eventually move, may want to influence people 
in other jurisdictions, and may seek to control interstate externalities. All of this might 
actually spur mobile residents to prefer policymaking be situated at the highest level 
available to satisfy their preferences. See Pettys, supra note 2, at 497-518. This 
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Two points bear noting at this juncture about the devolutionary 
tendencies of residential sorting. First, Tiebout did not disaggregate 
different types of mobile residents, given that his model situates at its 
core the fact of heterogeneous preferences across the mobile 
population. Tiebout, for example, made the stylized assumption that 
residents were unconstrained by employment because they all lived on 
dividend income.35 The paradigmatic mobile resident in the Tiebout 
model is thus not individuated in any way; it is the nature of the 
bundle of local public goods and tax burden, rather than any 
individual circumstances, that drives locational choice.36 In other 
words, because Tiebout’s consumer-voters are presumed to be moving 
primarily for the comparative advantages of a given governmental 
context, these mobile consumer-voters are presumed to span the range 
of potential preferences. For Tiebout, then, there is nothing distinctive 
about any given mobile resident, and all mobile residents equally 
participate in the same preference-sorting mechanism.37 In practice, 
however, some mobile residents tend to have greater influence in the 
interaction between mobility and governance, as we explain below.38 
Second, underlying the Tiebout hypothesis is a set of assumptions 
about the scale of public goods — both in terms of demand and 
supply. Tiebout himself used the example of a public beach — arguing 
that a community of a certain size might have a certain demand for a 
given size of beachfront.39 This is about as local a public good as can 
be imagined, as Tiebout describes it as a fixed feature of the local 
landscape within the boundaries of a single jurisdiction.40 Put another 
way, these public goods — and the broader mix of governmental 
services, taxation, and regulation that might attract consumer-voters 
— are assumed to be “local” for intuitive reasons that vaguely invoke 
some notion of the appropriate scale of governmental entity to provide 
that particular good.41 
 
argument has intuitive appeal, but does not obviate the structural prescriptions 
normally associated with mobility. 
 35 See Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419.  
 36 Tiebout made this assumption to isolate the effect of governmental policy on 
mobility and, of course, the effect of mobility on governmental policy. 
 37 This ignores the distinction between willingness to pay and ability to pay, 
among other simplifying assumptions discussed below. See discussion infra Part I.B.2. 
 38 See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 39 Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419. 
 40 The fact that a public beach is classically congestible does not mean that the 
Tiebout model applies only to such public goods. As noted, the paradigm has been 
applied to a broad array of governmental outputs. See sources cited supra note 27. 
 41 Cf. Hannah Wiseman, Public Communities, Private Rules, 98 GEO. L.J. 697, 727 
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But the scale of both demand and supply in the Tiebout model need 
not be local at all. This aspect of sorting is most often simply assumed. 
Many public goods that the literature tends to assume are “local” have 
no inherent fixed scale. Public safety, education, land use regulation 
— indeed, the entire range of classic local government functions — 
have been and are today supplied to some extent by regional-scale 
public entities.42 There are reasons, independent of responding to the 
preferences of mobile residents, in terms of accountability, 
effectiveness, and efficiency, to supply any given public good at the 
most local level at which it can be provided. But there are 
countervailing arguments in terms of inclusion, economies of scale, 
the scope of impact for regional supply, and network effects.43 The 
argument in this Article will hold these countervailing propositions 
constant, given that the appropriate level of government to supply any 
given public good is an empirical question, in order to focus instead 
on the influence of mobility on governance. 
In sum, for Tiebout, mobility was decidedly a metropolitan-scale 
phenomenon, and the basic intersection of supply and demand of 
public goods in the model focused on local-level concerns. Legal 
scholars have drawn on this framework to argue for devolution and 
decentralization in governmental authority and structure, but the link 
between scale and the metaphorical transaction of Tieboutian mobility 
can be shifted if the scale of residential choice is not simply local. 
Before we turn to that shift, it is important to pause and consider some 
critiques of the basic paradigm and its potential consequences. 
 
(2010) (noting that consumer-voter preference sorting can be sub-local as well as 
local). 
 42 School districts, for example, often transcend the boundaries of the local 
governments of general jurisdiction they serve, and some school districts even 
encompass regional scale. See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Making a Regional District: 
Memphis City Schools Dissolve into its Suburbs, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 47, 48-49 
(2012). 
 43 See Roger B. Parks & Ronald J. Oakerson, Regionalism, Localism, and 
Metropolitan Governance: Suggestions from the Research Program on Local Public 
Economies, 32 ST. & LOC. GOV’T REV. 169, 170-71 (2000); see also Laurie Reynolds, 
Intergovernmental Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 WASH. 
L. REV. 93, 109-11 (2003) (discussing regionalist arguments). Economists have 
developed a literature on the scale of public goods, focusing on a variety of supply-
side questions, such as economies of scale and scope for particular public goods and, 
in the institutional economics literature, on the structure of local service providers. 
The literature on localism and regionalism has also disaggregated, on the supply side, 
between the production of public goods and the provision of those goods, noting that 
arguments for regional supply need not imply any particular institutional arrangement 
for that supply. See Parks & Oakerson, supra, at 170-71. 
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B. Critiques of Sorting’s Devolutionary Implications 
There are two general lines of criticism that have emerged to the 
paradigm of mobility influencing local governance. The first set of 
critiques, which we label internal, challenges the assumptions and the 
functioning of the model itself. The second, which we label 
consequential, raises instrumental and conceptual concerns about the 
results of privileging transactional entrance (and exit) in local 
decision-making, notably around distributional concerns and the 
perils of commodification. We address these concerns here to assess 
their relevance to a perspective on mobility that shifts from localist to 
regionalist.44 
1. Internal Critiques 
There are several basic grounds on which the Tiebout model has 
been challenged in terms of the mechanism it describes.45 First, some 
commentators have argued against the plausibility of consumer-voters 
making locational choices based on the packet of available public 
services, regulation, and taxation.46 People move for a variety of 
reasons, so the argument goes, whether for employment opportunities, 
housing preferences, or familial obligations.47 These choices have little 
to do — at least directly — with local governance and the “noise” 
from these determinants of locational choice will almost always drown 
out the “signal” of the effect of governance. The best that can be said 
on this point is that there is empirical evidence of Tiebout sorting,48 
that people may have ways (perhaps indirect) to cut through the 
informational clutter,49 and many aspects of locational choice that 
 
 44 See discussion infra Part III.B. 
 45 Wallace Oates pointedly noted that the Tiebout model relies on “a set of 
assumptions so patently unrealistic as to verge on the outrageous.” Wallace E. Oates, 
On Local Finance and the Tiebout Model, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 93, 93 (1981). That has, 
however, hardly diminished the model’s influence. 
 46 Cf. Robert C. Ellickson, Legal Sources of Residential Lock-Ins: Why French 
Households Move Half as Often As U.S. Households, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 373, 378-93 
(surveying motivations for relocation and legal constraints on mobility). 
 47 See, e.g., id. at 394-98; Barry Friedman, Valuing Federalism, 82 MINN. L. REV. 
317, 387-88 (1997) (“People can and do move, but inertia is a large factor in why each 
of us lives where we do. Even when moves occur, they tend to be for reasons largely 
unrelated to government policy decisions: We move because our work takes us 
elsewhere, or because of marriage or some other personal need, or perhaps because of 
climate and health.”). 
 48 See sources cited supra note 20. 
 49 See generally Kenneth N. Bickers & Robert M. Stein, The Microfoundations of the 
Tiebout Model, 34 URB. AFF. REV. 76 (1998) (discussing informational heuristics and 
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might seem endogenous actually do reflect the effects of local 
policies.50 
Second, commentators have argued that there is no clear mechanism 
for channeling the threat of exit and the promise of entrance into the 
political process, at least at the level of salience that the Tiebout 
paradigm assumes. Tiebout was largely silent about the actual process 
through which the local political system would operate to produce a 
mix of local public goods that would appeal to a given set of mobile 
residents.51 Many scholars have accordingly critiqued the absence of 
politics in the Tiebout model,52 as well as the lack of consideration for 
how consumer-voters might actually evaluate (and influence) the 
political process through entrance and exit, rather than through 
“voice” and “loyalty,” to continue with the Hirschman frame.53 
Some scholars have offered ways to reconcile the Tieboutian quasi-
market with more realistic assumptions about the local political 
process and the governance-related information that might be 
available to Tiebout’s footloose residents.54 For present purposes, 
however, it is only necessary to acknowledge Tiebout’s assumption 
that there would be some mechanism — which was not necessary to 
define — for the local political process to create a bundle of public 
goods that allowed competition for mobile residents.55 This 
 
proxies as a tool to foster Tieboutian sorting by consumer-voters). 
 50 See Pettys, supra note 2, at 505. 
 51 Tiebout merely said, taking an oddly agnostic view of the line between public and 
private entities, that “communities below the optimum size, through chambers of 
commerce or other agencies seek to attract new residents.” Tiebout, supra note 1, at 419. 
 52 See, e.g., Susan Rose-Ackerman, Tiebout Models and the Competitive Ideal: An 
Essay on the Political Economy of Local Government, in 1 PERSPECTIVES ON LOCAL PUBLIC 
FINANCE AND PUBLIC POLICY 23 (John M. Quigley ed., 1983) (discussing models of 
local government behavior and arguing in favor of incorporating realism in 
assumptions about that behavior). 
 53 See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 20, at 234. Albert O. Hirschman 
famously contrasted methods through which stakeholders could respond to negative 
conditions in various institutions: “exit” (leaving the institution) and “voice” 
(participation). Hirschman argued that “loyalty” would influence the relative valence 
of exit and voice. See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: 
RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES (1970). 
 54 See Saiger, supra note 27, at 98-102 (discussing the literature).  
 55 Urban theory and some strains of local government legal theory have long 
focused on the limits of local authority in the face of mobile capital and labor. See 
Richard C. Schragger, Mobile Capital, Local Economic Regulation, and the Democratic 
City, 123 HARV. L. REV. 482, 489-91 (2009). The Tieboutian framework, by contrast, 
assumes as a baseline at least some ability to compete and a corresponding view of 
local governments as empowered entities. See Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 2, at 
399-419, 426. Of course, there are significant differences in kinds of mobile factors 
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simplifying assumption can still pertain even if institutions at different 
scales of governance are the locus of intergovernmental competition, 
although there may be greater practical barriers to regional 
governance.56 
These internal critiques — and other challenges to Tiebout’s basic 
hypothesis57 — may have validity, but we are generally assuming for 
the sake of argument that the overall paradigm works roughly in the 
way Tiebout proposed. Those who assert that governance is not 
influenced by mobility should, as a default matter, be inclined to be 
skeptical of that mechanism at whatever scale it plays out.58 
2. Consequentialist Critiques 
For all of its undoubted influence in the legal literature, the 
devolutionary tendencies of the Tiebout model have raised significant 
consequential concerns.59 These primarily focus on the tendency of 
sorting to exacerbate socio-economic, racial, and ethnic segregation 
and, more conceptually, on the threat that a theoretical “marketplace” 
of local governance poses to local democracy and community.60 
 
that might influence local politics. See sources cited supra note 32. 
 56 See infra text accompanying notes 176-180. 
 57 See generally John D. Donahue, Tiebout? Or Not Tiebout? The Market Metaphor 
and America’s Devolution Debate, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 73 (1997) (arguing that devolution 
will do more to hinder government than improve it). These critiques focus, for 
example, on the potential distorting effects in practice of the simplifying assumptions 
that Tiebout made to model mobility as a driver for the output of public goods. See, 
e.g., Oates, supra note 45 (discussing the simplifying assumptions inherent to 
Tiebout’s model). To note again, this Article does not focus primarily on these 
technical responses to Tiebout’s original stylized model, but rather on the reception of 
the model in the discourse in legal literature on vertical division of governmental 
authority. 
 58 See discussion infra Part III.B.1. 
 59 Aaron Saiger has perceptively argued that it is important to disaggregate 
critiques of localism from more particular concerns about the consequences of the 
Tieboutian mechanism of sorting. See Saiger, supra note 27, at 95. We accept this 
proposition for purposes of this discussion and focus particularly on critiques of 
arguments derived from the devolutionary implications of Tiebout’s quasi-market, not 
on the nature of local government itself or the problems that might arise from 
fragmentation, such as an increase in negative externalities. See Briffault, Our 
Localism, supra note 2, at 433-34. 
 60 Some legal scholars have also critiqued the devolutionary tendencies of the 
Tiebout model for the challenges that its resulting fragmentation pose for solving 
complex, regional-scale problems. William Buzbee, for example, has argued that 
municipal fragmentation can create a regulatory tragedy of the commons, where 
collective action problems create incentives for regulatory inattention that prevent 
appropriate intervention. See William W. Buzbee, Recognizing the Regulatory 
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The first, and perhaps most powerful, consequentialist critique of 
Tieboutian sorting highlights the distributional consequences that 
flow from fragmentation and the competition for mobile residents. 
The heart of this critique focuses on the reality that ability to pay is 
not the same as willingness to pay — in other words, many consumer-
voters, given their financial constraints, are simply not able to choose 
the mix of public amenities that they would genuinely prefer.61 This 
limitation may be acceptable for many market transactions, indeed it is 
inherent to the nature of most markets, but is objectionable when 
applied to education, public safety, local environmental quality, and 
other aspects of the Tieboutian bundle of public goods. It also ignores 
the reality that jurisdictions do not compete passively in this model 
(and in real life) by simply proffering a bundle of local public goods 
and seeing who responds. Rather, local governments use their 
authority to constrain entrance in ways that skew the “market” in 
favor of more desirable residents.62 
Indeed, one of the most important assumptions in the Tiebout 
model is that mobility is unconstrained. This assumption is not only 
false as a general matter,63 but becomes particularly troubling when 
mobility is constrained because of discrimination and the legacy of 
segregation. Thus, some scholars argue that the distributional 
consequences of Tiebout sorting have a pernicious racial and ethnic 
component in addition to a basic tendency toward economic 
segregation.64 
 
Commons: A Theory of Regulatory Gaps, 89 IOWA L. REV. 1, 49-52 (2003). This is a 
valid concern but applies to devolution more generally and is not particular to the 
quasi-marketing sorting mechanism itself that Tiebout posited. 
 61 See Saiger, supra note 27, at 94 (noting that because the Tieboutian argument 
for “efficiency assumes a budget constraint — goods are efficiently allocated if they go 
to those most willing to pay for them — efficiency in the distribution of public goods 
helps the rich more than the poor”). 
 62 As a number of scholars have noted, if locational preferences reflected in 
Tiebout sorting correlate with wealth, then Tiebout’s method of achieving allocative 
efficiency can encourage the wealthy to seek communities — and communities to 
respond to this preference — that privilege exclusion. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell, 
Exclusion’s Attraction: Land Use Controls in Tieboutian Perspective, in TIEBOUT AT FIFTY, 
supra note 5, at 163; Saiger, supra note 27, at 122, 134, 140 (asserting that if local 
governments are given more flexibility, they would likely draw discriminatory 
boundaries). 
 63 See Gerald Frug, City Services, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 23, 33 (1998) (noting that 
when exclusionary zoning is incorporated into the Tiebout model, communities have 
both the incentive and the means to calve off in order to compete for the wealthiest 
residents and exclude the poorest, in order to enlarge their tax base and avoid the 
costs of providing for the neediest citizens). 
 64 See, e.g., Cashin, supra note 15, at 2016-19 (discussing the role race plays in 
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A second source of concern about Tieboutian sorting in the legal 
literature comes from commentators who criticize what it means 
conceptually, and in practice, to conceptualize local governments as 
firms competing for customers. These scholars contend that this kind 
of commodification of local governance undermines community and 
warps the public nature of what local governments are actually about. 
Gerald Frug argues, for example, that focusing on competition treats 
the kinds of services that cities provide as “objects of consumption,” 
rather than elements of common interest.65 It also tends to reinforce 
the idea that people choose a place “in the way they choose a country 
club,” that is, to be with other like-minded people.66 Similarly, Richard 
Schragger asserts that the Tieboutian quasi-marketplace generates a 
privatized conception of local government in which ability to pay 
drives local decision-making, and the consumptive ideal creates a 
distorted sense of entitlement in exclusion.67 
These closely related concerns about the distributional and 
commodifying consequences of Tieboutian mobility can be 
counterbalanced by defenses of the value of localism.68 For our 
purposes, however, it is not necessary here to take a position on what 
has been a more than fifty-year-long debate. Rather, these concerns are 
worth rehearsing for the light they shed on alternative conceptions of 
the role of mobility that highlight locational choice-based levels of 
governance beyond the purely local. It is to those conceptions that we 
now turn.69 
II. INTERREGIONAL MOBILITY AND CONTEMPORARY HUMAN CAPITAL 
Despite important critiques, the Tiebout model retains its 
explanatory power in support of strong norms of localism. The 
paradigm, as noted, assumes that residential sorting and jurisdictional 
 
locational sorting in American metropolitan regions); see also Richard Thompson 
Ford, Geography and Sovereignty: Jurisdictional Formation and Racial Segregation, 49 
STAN. L. REV. 1365, 1366 (1997); Alexandra M. Greene, An Examination of Tiebout 
Sorting and Residential Segregation Through A Racialized Lens, 8 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 
135, 136 (2008). 
 65 Frug, supra note 63, at 28-29. 
 66 Id. 
 67 See Richard Schragger, Consuming Government, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1824, 1848 
(2003). 
 68 See, e.g., Saiger, supra note 27 (discussing the many advantages of Tieboutian 
localism and efficiency). 
 69 We will return to these critiques below to examine the extent to which a 
regionalist perspective on Tieboutian mobility alters their parameters. See discussion 
infra Part III.B. 
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competition takes place among local governments within a region, and 
does so with some empirical support. This conception is incomplete, 
however, as sorting and competition for mobile residents occurs 
among metropolitan regions, qua regions, not just the localities within 
them. 
To understand this proposition, this Part evaluates the empirical 
evidence that a significant portion of the population moves 
interregionally. It then canvasses the proposition that these mobile 
residents are attuned to regional-scale amenities and that metropolitan 
regions are, as an economic and social unit, as salient as local 
governments. The Part concludes by considering the relevance of 
recent debates about what motivates mobility — particularly the 
balance between agglomeration economies and amenities in the 
competition for human capital — for the light these debates shed on 
the regional scale of the preferences of many mobile residents. 
A. The Salience of Metropolitan Regions for Mobility 
Much residential mobility in the United States is intraregional, with 
the majority of moves occurring within the same county and/or within 
the same state.70 It is therefore easy to assume that the prototypical 
Tieboutian consumer-voter “shops” only between communities within 
a given metropolitan region.71 This assumption, however, ignores the 
fact that a significant portion of residential moves every year are from 
region to region. These movers are, in essence, engaged in a process of 
regional comparison shopping. At least some — and an increasingly 
important subset of — mobile residents are thus expressing their 
preference for regional goods and services, not simply comparing local 
governments. Not surprisingly, then, regions are competing for mobile 
residents. This is evidenced by economic development policies aimed 
at attracting and retaining these residents. 
 
 70 See, e.g., JASON P. SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 1990–
1995 1 (2000) [hereinafter SCHACTER, 1990–95], available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2000pubs/p23-200.pdf (listing the five-year moving rates, in the period between 
1975 and 1995, which demonstrate that the majority of moves, over 50 percent, are 
within the same county; approximately 20 percent occur between counties within the 
same state; approximately 20 percent occur between counties in different states; and 
about 5 percent of moves are from abroad); JASON P. SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY: 2002–2003 2 (2004), available at http://www.census. 
gov/prod/2004pubs/p20-549.pdf (finding that, similarly, in the period between 1993 and 
2003, approximately 59 percent of moves were within the same county; approximately 
19 percent were between counties within the same state; approximately 19 percent were 
between counties in different states; and about 3 percent of moves are from abroad). 
 71 See Oates, supra note 5, at 34-35. 
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1. The Empirics of Interregional Mobility 
Significant portions of the population make interregional moves 
each year, moving from one metropolitan area to another.72 Census 
data reflects this regional movement by tracking net in-migration and 
out-migration for the largest metropolitan areas in the country.73 
There are other sources of mobility data that fill out the picture on 
how and where the population moves in a given year, including IRS 
data and the Current Population Survey data, but all are flawed to 
some extent.74 One study, for example, estimated that over an average 
five-year period about 15 percent of the United States population 
moves across metropolitan area boundaries, although the study noted 
that it was only able to capture a subset of moves from another 
identified metropolitan area or across state or county lines.75 
 
 72 This interregional and interstate mobility is significant given that, according to 
the most recent U.S. Census data, as of 2010 over four-fifths of the population 
(roughly 83 percent) lived in the nation’s 366 major metro areas. See PAUL MACKUN & 
STEVEN WILSON, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, POPULATION DISTRIBUTION AND CHANGE: 2000 TO 
2010, 4 (2011), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/cen2010/briefs/c2010br-
01.pdf. 
As discussed below, interregional metropolitan competition is no longer simply a 
domestic phenomenon, instead playing out increasingly as an international 
competition between so-called “global” cities and the regions that support them. This 
also has consequences for conceptions of the relationship between mobility and 
governance, as we shall see. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 73 See, e.g., SCHACTER, 1990–95, supra note 70, at 2 (reporting five-year net 
domestic migration for the top 20 metropolitan areas). This same Census series also 
tracks mobility among the broader regional sections of the Northeast, Midwest, South 
and West. See id. at 4-6 (reporting five-year net migration for these major regions).  
 74 See Raven Molloy et al., Internal Migration in the United States, 25 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 173, 178-79 (2011) (explaining the different sources of migration data and 
drawbacks of each). As Malloy et al. acknowledge, it is very difficult to capture with 
much precision the fraction of the population that crosses metropolitan area 
boundaries because of limitations in the scope of the data and how it is collected. Id. at 
175-76 (explaining that metro areas do not cover the entire U.S., especially rural 
areas; that metro area boundaries are revised every few years; and that metro area 
identifiers are not available in many public datasets). Given these limitations, 
researchers often use state and county lines to provide a reasonable proxy of 
intermetropolitan migration because those lines best approximate local labor and 
housing markets. See id. at 179. 
 75 See id. (using Census and American Community Survey data and averaging 
across the 1980, 1990, and 2000 Censuses). “According to five-year migration 
statistics from the Census and one-year migration statistics from ACS, virtually all (97 
percent) of cross-state migrants also changed metropolitan areas, while only 60 to 70 
percent of migrants across metropolitan areas also changed states.” Id. This suggests, 
according to these researchers, that interstate migration underestimates the number of 
people that move across local labor and housing market boundaries, and intercounty 
migration overstates metro area migration, as only three-quarters of cross-county 
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Given these challenges, we examined county-to-county migration 
data from the Internal Revenue Service as well as the Census Bureau’s 
five-year American Community Survey.76 Examining the ten largest 
metropolitan areas in 2009 and 2010,77 the data indicate that about 
16.5 percent and 16.2 percent, respectively, of all residential moves 
represented immigration from outside the metro region.78 These 
results are broadly consonant with other research and reinforce the 
proposition that, although there has been a general downward trend in 
migration over the past 25 years or so,79 of those who do migrate, a 
significant fraction choose to move to new metropolitan regions. 
2. The Role of Metropolitan Regions in Mobility Decisions 
Population growth patterns across the United States suggest that 
large metropolitan regions are a destination for the most mobile of 
residents. The vast majority of Americans live in major metropolitan 
 
migrants changed metro areas. Id. at 180. 
 76 The Internal Revenue Service data was the County-to-County Migration Inflow 
Dataset from the IRS’s Statistics of Income Division (“SOI”), extracted from the IRS 
Individual Master File, which contains administrative data collected for every Form 
1040, 1040A, and 1040EZ processed by the IRS. Each return is geocoded with a five 
digit number that tracks state and county, and migration status can be determined by 
matching subsequent returns over a two-year period. See generally INTERNAL REVENUE 
SERVICE, SUPPLEMENTAL DOCUMENTATION FOR MIGRATION DATA PRODUCTS, 2009-2010, 
http://www.irs.gov/file_source/pub/irs-soi/0910inpublicmigdoc.doc (providing details 
on how IRS migration data was collected) (last visited Sept. 22, 2013). 
 77 The analysis was limited to these two years based on data availability, as the SOI 
data is not yet available for 2011 and the ACS survey only began providing 
information on a county level (in the five-year data series) in 2009. See AMERICAN 
COMMUNITY SURVEY, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 2-4 (2009), 
available at http://www.census.gov/acs/www/Downloads/survey_methodology/acs_ 
design_methodology.pdf. The analysis used the U.S. Office of Management and 
Budget’s (OMB) metropolitan statistical area (MSA) delineations as the basis for 
determining relevant metro regions. See 2010 Standards for Delineating Metropolitan 
and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 75 Fed. Reg. 37,246 (June 28, 2010). 
 78 The population of the top 10 MSAs in 2009 and 2010 was 58,725,300 and 
58,971,589, respectively, per the SOI data. A total of 9,706,525 and 9,527,372 people 
migrated, using a combination of SOI and CPS data. Of these migrants, 6,690,500 and 
6,579,031 moved within their county of origin, according to CPS data. The SOI 
indicates that 1,443,157 and 1,466,089 migrants stayed within the MSA, but moved to 
a county other than their county of origin. Finally, 1,572,868 and 1,482,252 people 
moved into the MSA from outside of the MSA (SOI), which provides an estimate for 
interregional migration. 
 79 See Molloy et al., supra note 74, at 173, 180-81 (noting the puzzling decline in 
migration from 1980–2009; that interstate and interregional moves reached their 
“inflection point” in 1980; and that migration rates, including across short distances, 
are currently lower than at any point in post-War period). 
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areas consisting of a core urban population of 50,000 or more, and 
such areas grew almost twice as fast as smaller urban areas in the last 
10 years.80 Moreover, the fate of smaller urban areas seems to be 
inextricably tied to the fate of the largest nearby major metropolitan 
areas.81 In fact, large metropolitan regions are responsible for a 
significant portion of the population growth in their respective states82 
and many of the fastest growing counties in the United States are part 
of these large, integrated metro regions.83 Therefore, both as a 
geographic unit and as a destination, metropolitan regions are a 
destination for many Americans, and current urban growth patterns 
increasingly bear this out.84 
Metropolitan regions are important for understanding a key aspect 
of contemporary domestic mobility for at least two reasons. First, 
regions are increasingly integrated social and economic units and not 
simply a set of distinct counties and local municipalities.85 
 
 80 See MACKUN & WILSON, supra note 72, at 4-6 (noting that over four-fifths, or 
83.7 percent, of the U.S. population in 2010 lived in the nation’s 366 major 
metropolitan areas consisting of a core urban population of at least 50,000 and that 
one-tenth, or 10 percent, of the population lived in the nation’s 576 “micro” areas 
consisting of a core urban population between 10,000 and 50,000). According to the 
latest Census, the most populous metropolitan regions include New York-Northern 
New Jersey-Long Island; Los Angeles-Long Beach-Santa Ana; Chicago-Joliet-
Naperville; Dallas-Fort Worth-Arlington; Philadelphia-Camden-Wilmington; 
Houston-Sugar Land-Baytown; Washington-Arlington-Alexandria; Miami-Fort 
Lauderdale-Pompano Bach; Atlanta-Sandy-Springs-Marietta; and Boston-Cambridge-
Quincy. The fastest growing metro regions include quite populous (1 million or more) 
metro regions such as Las-Vegas-Paradise; Raleigh-Cary; and Austin-Round Rock-San 
Marcos. Id. at 4. 
 81 Id. at 5 (noting that “[m]any of the fastest growing ‘micro’ areas were located 
near fast-growing metro areas” and, “[l]ikewise, many of the micro areas that were 
slow-growing” or in decline were located near slow-growing or declining major 
metropolitan areas). 
 82 As an example, the Atlanta metro region accounted for over two-thirds (68 
percent) of Georgia’s population growth during the last decade; the Houston and 
Dallas-Fort Worth metro regions together accounted for over one-half (56.9 percent) 
of Texas’ population growth over the same period; and the Las Vegas metro area 
accounted for almost four-fifths (81.9 percent) of Nevada’s growth. Id. at 4-5. 
 83 See id. at 8-9 (giving as examples counties in the metro Chicago, Palm Coast, 
Washington, D.C., Dallas-Fort Worth, among others, which more than doubled their 
population between 2000 and 2010). 
 84 There is an identity element to this as well. People within metropolitan areas 
may jealously guard the distinction between neighborhoods, but ask any American 
traveler abroad where they’re from and chances are that they will at least start by 
answering with the metro area where they live. 
 85 See ZACHARY NEAL, THE CONNECTED CITY: HOW NETWORKS ARE SHAPING THE 
MODERN METROPOLIS 111 (2012) (noting that “metropolitan character comes from the 
fact that the independent parts of these regions — cities, suburbs, towns — are really 
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Metropolitan regions traverse many counties, and sometimes more 
than one state, and are generally composed of a core urban area and 
adjacent counties that have a “high degree of social and economic 
integration (as measured by commuting to work) with the urban 
core.”86 
Traditional commuter patterns of suburb-to-suburb and suburb-to-
city illustrate this integration as metro areas move from core-and-
periphery models to increasingly interconnected networked regions.87 
So too does the increased rate of “reverse commuting,” in which 
people increasingly live in the central city and work in one of the 
surrounding suburbs.88 The increase in reverse commuting over the 
past twenty years or so reflects not only the decentralization of 
employment within metropolitan areas, but also mobility trends into 
large urban markets and, more particularly, into core cities to take 
advantage of the consumption value of those cities.89 All of these 
patterns underscore increasing metropolitan functional integration. 
Second, and to underscore the first point, it seems apparent that 
regions attract residents, not simply individual municipalities or even 
counties.90 Metropolitan regions — that is, core cities and their 
 
not independent at all, but are closely linked to one another in a wide variety of 
ways”); see also BERNADETTE HANLON, JOHN RENNIE SHORT & THOMAS J. VICINO, CITIES 
AND SUBURBS: NEW METROPOLITAN REALITIES IN THE U.S. 3-6 (2010).  
 86 See MACKUN & WILSON, supra note 72, at 4.  
 87 OMB’s broad definition of metropolitan areas — “Core Based Statistical Areas” 
— underscores the view of metro regions as central cores and peripheral areas, which 
also resonates with historical views of metropolitan regions, such as Von Thunen’s 
“city and hinterland” view and the Chicago-school concentric-circle model. See NEAL, 
supra note 85, at 111-12. Increasingly, however, scholars are recognizing the 
networked nature of metro regions in ways that emphasize functional interconnection 
across a region over the center/periphery paradigm. See id. at 112-13. 
 88 See Edward Glaeser et al., The Consumer City, 1 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 27, 33-34 
(2001) [hereinafter Consumer City] (noting that city-to-suburb commutes almost 
tripled between 1960 and 1990). As an example, Glaeser measured the relative rise in 
population of employed workers in the Bay Area relative to the rise of employment in 
the area. Central San Francisco was one of only three counties where population rose 
faster than employment between 1960 and 1990. This rise reflects the increase in San 
Francisco residents who work outside of the city and presumably live in the city for 
consumption reasons. Id. at 34. 
 89 See Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence and the 
Consumer City, 43 URB. STUD. 1275, 1284-85 (2006) [hereinafter Urban Resurgence]. 
 90 Nicole Garnett has argued that the link that regionalists make between cities 
and suburbs ignores the reality that for many suburban residents, “central cities likely 
play only a small role in [their] economic lives,” and that because some residents have 
had “decidedly anti-urban experiences,” they “may lack the aesthetic and cultural 
affinities that would lead them to take advantage of urban amenities” in their center 
cities. Nicole Stelle Garnett, Suburbs as Exit, Suburbs as Entrance, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
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surrounding suburbs — are attractive to consumers because of the 
presence of goods and services which have regional-scale economies 
dependent on large audiences (e.g., sports teams, large opera 
companies, comprehensive arts museums, and the like).91 Even more 
salient in the modern economy, regional urban scale supports 
institutions such as medical centers, large universities, networks of 
entrepreneurs, and other aspects of an ecosystem of innovation that 
depend on a certain critical mass.92 And, of course, housing and labor 
markets in most metropolitan areas tend to operate on a regional 
scale.93 Location decisions are accordingly likely to account for the 
social and economic amenities and assets of the metropolitan region, 
not simply its constituent parts. As Richard Briffault has argued, given 
the high correlation between city and suburban growth in 
employment, income, and population, localities within a region “tend 
to rise and fall together.”94 
It is true that the social and economic health of the central city often 
drives the perception of the region as a whole, in part because “central 
cities continue to be the setting of many specialized activities, business 
services, and cultural amenities that serve the surrounding 
metropolitan region.”95 However, even when commercial activity is 
concentrated in suburban nodes or edge cities, the attractiveness of 
those parts of the region are driven by what its constituent parts offer 
to incoming industry and workers.96 To the extent that one or more 
localities in those commercial nodes are unable to provide the type 
and level of public goods and amenities that appeal to the desired 
 
277, 295 (2007). That does not belie the reality that regional movers — even if they 
move, as many surely do, from a suburb in one region to a suburb in another — are 
still making regional-scale decisions. 
 91 See Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 32-34 (noting that scale 
economies meant that specialized retail can only by supported in places large enough 
to have a critical mass of customers).  
 92 See generally ALAN BERUBE, METRONATION: HOW U.S. METROPOLITAN AREAS FUEL 
AMERICAN PROSPERITY (2007) (discussing metropolitan-scale drivers of economic 
growth). 
 93 Ironically, intraregional mobility in the traditional Tieboutian paradigm actually 
underscores the reality that both labor markets and housing markets are increasingly 
regional in scale. People within a region have options as to where to move and where 
to work — often constrained, it is true — but make those decisions in the context of a 
metropolitan area. 
 94 Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3, at 1138-39. 
 95 Id. at 1139. 
 96 See David L. McKee & Yosra A. McKee, Edge Cities and the Viability of 
Metropolitan Economies: Contributions to Flexibility and External Linkages by New 
Urban Service Environments, 60 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 171, 177-78 (2001). 
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industry and mobile residents, the attractiveness of the region 
suffers.97 It is thus the amenities and features of the region itself that 
often make it a distinct “place” — features that can transcend any 
particular local government within a metropolitan area, even if they 
can in some respects be a product of the aggregation of the region’s 
local amenities.98 In short, for interregional moves, much of what 
lends salience to the choice of one metropolitan area over another is 
inherently regional in scale.99 
B. Regional-Scale Demand: The Role of Agglomeration Economies and 
Urban Amenities 
It is not simply that metropolitan regions fundamentally matter as 
economic and social units for purposes of understanding current 
patterns of residential mobility. It is also that certain types of movers 
are particularly salient to understanding contemporary interregional 
mobility. This section explores two contemporary understandings of 
metropolitan mobility and growth in a knowledge-based economy, 
each of which links what attracts human capital to the scale of 
governance. These debates provide telling evidence that many 
interregional movers do, in fact, make locational choices based in part 
on a comparative evaluation of regional-scale institutions. 
 
 97 Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3, at 1140 (noting that “the 
consequences of inadequate local schools, unsafe local streets and homes, 
unaffordable local housing, and unreliable local transportation networks in some 
localities may be borne by all localities throughout the region, including those 
localities providing high-quality services to their own residents”). 
 98 Local governments’ ability to fully control the quality or availability of amenities 
for its residents is limited as a result of interlocal and regional spillovers. As Richard 
Schragger has astutely noted, the full costs and benefits of local amenities are borne 
not just by residents within the local jurisdiction, but also by neighboring users who 
“regularly cross borders” across localities. Schragger, supra note 67, at 1830-31. Thus 
the quality and availability of even “local” amenities are determined as much by local 
residents as by residents throughout the region. These interlocal or regional effects, in 
turn, affect home values within a region, reducing the ability of local governments to 
fully control those values within their own borders. Id. at 1830 (pointing to evidence 
that “much of the value of one’s housing investment — negative or positive — might 
very well turn on the specific decisions, activities, or fiscal health of neighboring 
jurisdictions”). 
 99 It is fair to ask at this juncture whether interregional movers may simply be 
localists seeking their preferred Tieboutian local government bundle of public goods 
in metropolitan regions other than their own. We bracket this question for the 
moment and return to it in depth below. See discussion infra Part III.A.2. 
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1. The Importance of Human Capital in Understanding Mobility 
As noted, the traditional Tiebout framework assumes the 
heterogeneity of mobile residents and the agnosticism of local 
governments to the range of consumer-voters.100 It is increasingly 
clear, however, that some potentially mobile residents are more salient 
than others in driving contemporary metropolitan growth. The 
geographic sorting of people by education and by skill is well 
recognized, with the higher skilled and the better educated becoming 
increasingly mobile, but also more concentrated in certain 
metropolitan regions.101 Education and skill level, in particular, are 
strongly correlated with the most populous and fastest-growing 
metropolitan regions.102 Not only are the most educated and most 
skilled most likely to pick up and move, but they tend to move longer 
distances than people with fewer skills and a lower level of 
education.103 
The traditional twentieth-century understanding of urban regional 
growth posited that the dominant factors in county and city 
population expansion were due to the natural advantages of certain 
locations. Since World War II, strong predictors of urban growth have 
included a region’s temperature and climate, dryness, and proximity to 
the coast and natural resources.104 However, over roughly the past 
 
 100 See supra Part I.A. 
 101 See ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 164 (2012); Richard Florida, 
Where the Brains Are, THE ATLANTIC (Oct. 1, 2006), http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/2006/10/where-the-brains-are/305202/; see, e.g., Chistopher R. Berry 
& Edward L. Glaeser, The Divergence of Human Capital Levels Across Cities, 84 PAPERS 
IN REG. SCI. 407 (2005) (documenting that places with higher levels of human capital 
have attracted more skilled people over the last decade). 
 102 See, e.g., RICHARD FLORIDA, THE RISE OF THE CREATIVE CLASS, REVISITED 203-18 
(2012) [hereinafter FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED] (the “creative class” is concentrated 
geographically in specific regions); Edward L. Glaeser & Albert Saiz, Rise of the Skilled 
City, 5 BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 47 (2003) (aside from climate, skill 
composition may be the most powerful predictor of urban growth). 
 103 See JASON SCHACTER, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WHY PEOPLE MOVE: EXPLORING THE 
MARCH 2000 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 1 (2001), available at http://www.census.gov/ 
prod/2001pubs/p23-204.pdf (noting that research shows that increases in age reduce the 
likelihood of moving until retirement age and that long distance moves are most 
common among the highly educated); see also SCHACTER, 1990–95, supra note 70, at 3 
(25-29 year olds have highest moving rates; reporting that 74.5 percent of them moved 
during 1990–1995; further reporting that 63 percent of 20-24 and 30-34 year olds 
moved during this period). 
 104 See, e.g., Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 35-36 (explaining that 
“results of multivariate regression show that county population growth shows the 
power of these natural variables to predict growth”); Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban 
Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1280 (noting that the urban agglomerations that once 
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twenty years, there has been a notable shift away from this 
understanding and towards the recognition that what drives urban 
growth today, after the decline of major American cities in the 1970s 
and 1980s, is the attraction of highly skilled, highly educated mobile 
residents to major cities and their surrounding regions. This is not to 
say that the natural amenities of some metropolitan regions do not 
continue to attract residents.105 Rather, it is that other factors have as 
much, if not more, explanatory and predictive power in understanding 
why particular regions attract residents.106 
Human capital theories that focus on the migration of workers with 
high levels of talent to amenities-rich locations are now the dominant 
explanation in urban economics for why some regions grow and 
others remain stagnant or decline.107 These theories trace to seminal 
works by Robert Lucas, Edward Glaeser, and Jane Jacobs, all of whom 
argue that human capital externalities are the basic mechanism of 
economic growth in cities.108 Since the 1980s, economists had 
explored the idea that positive externalities from industry clusters are 
the cause of increased productivity of firms and individuals. Positive 
externalities occur when the “net benefits to being in a location 
together with other firms increase with the number of firms in the 
 
lined the great lakes and northern rivers of the U.S. had the great advantages in that 
they were close to basic resources like coal and lumber and could access cheap water-
borne transport). 
 105 Sunbelt cities and metropolitan areas such as Phoenix, Atlanta, Dallas, and 
Houston, for example, have seen dramatic population growth in recent decades. 
Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1284-85 (noting that “the 
general trend to ‘sun and sprawl’ has continued relatively unabated over the past 20 
years”). 
 106 For example, the elasticity of housing supply explains some of the rise of 
Sunbelt cities in the 1990s. The housing supply, in turn, reflects the combination of 
abundant land, freeways, and pro-growth permitting. Edward L. Glaeser & Joshua D. 
Gottlieb, The Wealth of Cities: Agglomeration Economies and Spatial Equilibrium in the 
United States, 47 J. ECON. LITERATURE 983, 998 (2009) [hereinafter Wealth of Cities] 
(arguing that the urban growth literature has paid little attention to differences in 
housing supply that are critical to understanding the growth of metropolitan areas 
with high growth levels, moderate prices and moderate incomes like Houston and 
Atlanta). 
 107 See FLORIDA, CITIES, supra note 8, at 35-36, 45; Todd M. Gabe, The Value of 
Creativity, in HANDBOOK OF CREATIVE CITIES 128-45 (David Emanuel Andersson et al. 
eds., 2011); Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1276-80. 
 108 See JANE JACOBS, THE ECONOMY OF CITIES 233-34 (1969); Edward L. Glaeser et 
al., Growth in Cities, 100 J. POL. ECON. 1126, 1151 (1992) [hereinafter Growth in 
Cities]; Robert E. Lucas, On the Mechanics of Economic Development, 22 J. MONETARY 
ECON. 3, 36, 40 (1988).  
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location.”109 As first suggested by Alfred Marshall in Principles of 
Economics,110 industrial agglomerations exist in part because firms 
benefit from the higher productivity that results when skilled workers 
are located in the same region, thereby reducing labor search costs.111 
Clustered firms also benefit from economies of specialization, allowing 
the production of non-tradable specialized inputs, reduced costs of 
transporting materials from suppliers to customers, and informational 
spillovers that can stimulate growth and innovation in an industry. 
Industry clusters are found in Detroit’s automotive sector, New York 
City’s theater and garment industries, and technology firms in Silicon 
Valley, among others.112 
Based on this literature, urban economists like Glaeser have found 
similarly that individuals move to cities not only to increase their 
wages, but also to capitalize on the concentration of others from 
whom they can learn and increase their human capital.113 In this view, 
certain individuals move to cities and surrounding suburbs to increase 
their human capital gains by living close to people from whom they 
 
 109 See W. Brian Arthur, ‘Silicon Valley’ Locational Clusters: When Do Increasing 
Returns Imply Monopoly?, 19 MATHEMATICAL SOC. SCI. 235, 237 (1990). 
 110 Adam Smith had much earlier famously observed that economic specialization 
is fostered by the kind of density that prevails in urban environments. See ADAM 
SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 121-22 (Andrew Skinner ed., Penguin Books 1999) 
(1776) (noting that the division of labor, limited by the extent of the market, means 
that certain trades can be carried on “nowhere but in a great town,” and people are 
required to be generalists in “so desert a country as the Highlands of Scotland”). 
 111 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 332-33 (1890) (noting that “so 
great are the advantages which people following the same skilled trade get from near 
neighbourhood to one another”); Paul Krugman, Increasing Returns and Economic 
Geography, 99 J. POL. ECON. 483, 484-85 (1991). 
 112 FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 220 (also citing the maquiladora 
electronic and auto-parts districts in Mexico, the clusters of disk-drive manufacturers 
in Singapore, the flat-panel display industry in Japan, clusters of insurance companies 
in Hartford, casinos in Las Vegas, furniture manufactures in High Point N.C., and 
advanced imaging laboratories in Rochester, NY); see also PAUL KRUGMAN, GEOGRAPHY 
AND TRADE 35 (1991) (finding that most manufacturing sectors and many producer-
service industries have a large presence in a few geographical locations and very little 
going on elsewhere); Glenn Ellison & Edward L. Glaeser, Geographic Concentration in 
U.S. Manufacturing Industries: A Dartboard Approach, 105 J. POL. ECON. 889, 891-92 
(1997) (discussing Silicon Valley-style localizations of individual manufacturing 
industries in the United States). 
 113 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, Are Cities Dying?, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 139, 148 
(1998) (suggesting that the externality of knowledge spillovers in agglomeration 
economies may be more important at the individual level than at the firm level); 
Edward L. Glaeser, Learning in Cities, 46 J. URB. ECON. 254 (1999) (arguing that 
urbanization rises when returns to skills rise, the ability to learn by imitation rises, 
and the level of health in the economy rises). 
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can learn and with whom they can interact. Migration itself can be a 
form of human capital investment — a project that individuals can 
undertake to raise the returns on their labor.114 In addition to 
capturing returns on their labor, individuals also move to capture the 
benefits of agglomeration in cities and metropolitan regions. 
Agglomeration economics suggests that individuals more efficiently 
acquire skills in urban metropolitan areas because of the greater 
opportunities to interact with other highly educated and skilled 
people, thus increasing the rates of human capital accumulation, 
technological innovation, and ultimately, urban growth.115 
Economists have found tangible payoffs, in the form of higher wages 
and wage growth, for migrants to areas with a higher density of highly 
educated and skilled people. Not only do they earn more than their 
nonurban counterparts, but evidence suggests this urban wage 
premium stays with them when they leave urban areas.116 The core 
claim of agglomeration scholars is thus that individuals seeking 
efficiency and productivity gains make location decisions on the basis 
of where other individuals cluster. These agglomeration gains can 
include the ability to learn from other workers and gain additional 
skills through information spillovers, thereby increasing human 
capital and productivity.117 Undergirding these dynamics is the move 
 
 114 Molloy et al., supra note 74, at 181. For example, a standard human capital 
explanation for the propensity of the young to migrate is that migration is an 
investment and “if a higher income stream is available elsewhere, then the sooner a 
move is made, the sooner the gain is realized.” John Kennan & James R. Walker, Effect 
of Expected Income on Individual Migration Decisions, 79 ECONOMETRICA 211, 239 
(2011). Conversely, when returns to working in particular occupations become less 
geographically dispersed, as one study shows they have, this can help explain the 
falling migration rates in the past decade. See Greg Kaplan & Sam Schulhofer-Wohl, 
Understanding the Long-Run Decline in Interstate Migration 50 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 18507, 2012), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/ 
w18507. 
 115 Edward L. Glaeser & Matthew G. Resseger, The Complementarity Between Cities 
and Skills, 50 J. REGIONAL SCI. 221, 242 (2010), available at http://www.nber.org/ 
papers/w15103 (finding that some human capital accumulation is faster in 
metropolitan areas, that workers learn more quickly in metropolitan areas, and 
speculating that as a result the rate of technology change in cities is faster); see also 
Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 108, at 1127-34 (reviewing recent theories 
of economic growth which stress the role of technological and knowledge spillovers in 
generating urban growth). 
 116 Edward Glaeser & David Mare, Cities and Skills, 19 J. LAB. ECON. 316, 340 
(2001). 
 117 Giovanni Peri, Young Workers, Learning and Agglomeration, 52 J. URB. ECON. 
582, 594, 603 (2002); James E. Rauch, Productivity Gains from Geographic 
Concentration of Human Capital: Evidence from the Cities, 34 J. URB. ECON. 380, 399 
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from a manufacturing to a knowledge-based economy over the past 
half-century, which has raised the return on investments in human 
capital and influenced the growth of technology and innovation 
industries in urban areas.118 
Another important possible gain from agglomeration of high human 
capital is “matching,” a form of labor market pooling where workers 
have a greater likelihood of obtaining a better match between their 
skills and an employer and thereby increasing productivity and 
wages.119 While the proximity strain of agglomeration economics 
highlights the immediate benefits of smart people being near each 
other, matching supports the advantages of a broad diversity of 
opportunities. One advantage of being in an urban environment, then, 
is being able to trade across specialties — whether in employment or 
in the goods and services one offers.120 The greater the variety of 
 
(1993). Although it is not clear exactly how the relationship works between workers’ 
higher level of productivity and their presence in high skilled cities — that is, whether 
it is through “learning, innovation, both or neither.” Glaeser & Resseger, supra note 
115, at 222. 
Some scholars have even argued that highly educated and skilled individuals move 
to cities and metropolitan areas to increase the likelihood of finding a spouse or, if 
already married, to increase the likelihood that both spouses will find employment 
commensurate with the skills of each spouse. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, 
Power Couples: Changes in the Locational Choice of the College Educated, 1940–1990, 
115 Q. J. OF ECON. 1287, 1307 (2000); Lena Edlund, Sex and the City, 107 
SCANDINAVIAN J. OF ECON. 25, 40 (2005). 
 118 See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 193-94; EDWARD GLAESER, 
TRIUMPH OF THE CITY 28 (2011); Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 38, 42. Places with 
high numbers of well educated and highly skilled people tend to grow faster, generate 
higher incomes for their residents, and are generally better able to attract similar kinds 
of people to them. Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42; John M. Quigley, Urban 
Diversity and Economic Growth, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 127, 134-35 (1998); Edward L. 
Glaeser et al., Cities, Skills, and Regional Change 12 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 16934, 2011), available at http://www.nber.org/ papers/w16934. 
 119 Fredrik Andersson et al., Cities, Matching, and the Productivity Gains of 
Agglomeration, 61 J. URB. ECON. 112, 127 (2007); see also James R. Baumgardner, The 
Division of Labor, Local Markets, and Worker Organization, 96 J. POL. ECON. 509, 518 
(1988); Sunwoong Kim, Labor Specialization and the Extent of the Market, 97 J. POL. 
ECON. 692, 704 (1989). 
 120 Urban economists distinguish between the effects of urbanization (or 
diversification) economies, associated with a city’s population and employment levels 
and the diversity of its productive structure, and localization (or specialization) 
economies, associated with a city’s specialization in one specific sector. See Edward L. 
Glaeser et al., Growth in Cities, supra note 108, at 1129-30. Jane Jacobs, for example, 
believed that the most important knowledge transfers come from outside the core 
industry and, as a result, variety and diversity of geographically proximate industries 
rather than geographical specialization promote innovation and growth. See JACOBS, 
supra note 108, at 50-51. 
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possible matches, the more specialization is fostered. These advantages 
require a certain critical mass, and metropolitan regions as a whole 
have a much easier time providing the requisite diversity than do 
small local governments. 
2. The “Creative Class” and Contemporary Mobility Patterns 
Richard Florida famously expanded on the human capital approach 
by arguing that attraction of the “creative class,” a category that 
includes the well educated and others with particular skills and 
interests suited to the modern knowledge-based economy, is essential 
to regional economic development.121 Florida focused on people 
working in intensely creative occupations such as science, the arts, 
architecture, writing, and in knowledge-intensive fields like financial 
services and high technology.122 
Providing the kind of urban amenities that will attract highly mobile 
creative types, Florida argues, is fundamental to the growth of cities 
and regions.123 To attract them, cities should offer amenities like the 
arts and a cultural climate that appeals to young, upwardly and 
geographically mobile professionals.124 Two key amenities that will 
 
 121 See generally FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102 (arguing that the creative 
class is a vital part of regional economic development). According to Florida, the 
creative class goes beyond highly educated people (degree holders) to highly skilled 
people. While there is overlap between conventional measures of human capital (i.e., 
college degrees) and the creative class, they are not the same. Four in ten members of 
the creative class — or 16.6 million workers (out of estimated 41 million creative class 
workers; roughly one-third of U.S. workforce) — do not have college degrees. Id. at 
40-41, 45. 
 122 Id. at 42. 
 123 Id. at 280-82. Florida is not alone in contending that metropolitan consumption 
amenities are strongly correlated with the growth of cities and metropolitan areas. See, 
e.g., Terry Nichols Clark et al., Amenities Drive Urban Growth, 24 J. URB. AFF. 493 
(2002) (arguing that amenities play a larger role in driving growth in cities than is 
reflected in the growth machine model); Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88 
(finding that high amenity cities grow faster than low amenity cities); Jordan 
Rappaport, Consumption Amenities and City Population Density, 38 REGIONAL SCI. & 
URB. ECON. 553 (2008) [hereinafter Consumption] (finding that amenities support high 
population density and that moderate differences in consumption amenities can create 
vast differences in population density). 
 124 According to Florida, creative people do not move for traditional reasons. The 
physical attractions that most cities focus on building — sports stadiums, freeways, 
urban malls, and tourism and entertainment districts that resemble theme parks — are 
irrelevant, insufficient, or unattractive to them. What they look for instead are 
abundant high-quality amenities and experiences, openness to diversity of all kinds, 
and above all else the opportunity to validate their identities as creative people. The 
communities that the creative class are attracted to thrive because they are places where 
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draw this class to a particular place are “tolerance” and diversity, the 
measure of which is the concentration of bohemians (artists), gays, 
and foreign-born populations, as well as the degree of racial 
integration.125 Many of the most populous and fastest growing regions, 
according to Florida, are distinguished by a new model of economic 
development that takes shape around what he calls the “3Ts” of 
development — technology, talent, and tolerance — with the most 
successful metropolitan areas excelling at all three.126 
For Florida, creative-class mobility is regional in its dynamics and 
its implications. The attraction of the creative class to a city or county 
has significant positive spillovers to the entire region, as the 
concentration and interaction of creative people spurs high levels of 
innovation and the expansion of technology-intensive sectors in the 
region.127 Regions that attract the creative class also tend to provide an 
environment that is more open to innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
new firm formation.128 The presence of the creative class in a city or 
region, in turn, will attract the kind of firms that rely upon these 
workers.129 The growth of the creative class in a region leads directly 
 
creative people want to live. Creative centers provide the integrated ecosystems or 
habitat where all forms of creativity — artistic and cultural, technological and 
economic — can take root and flourish. FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 186. 
 125 This combination is tracked in what Florida calls the “Tolerance Index.” He has 
found (as have others) that there is a positive relationship between tolerance and 
economic growth. Id. at 244-49. 
 126 Id. at 228-36. Florida estimates that, as of 2010, the creative class composed 
more than 40 percent of the workforce in 11 metropolitan regions, 35 to 40 percent of 
the workforce in another 34 metropolitan regions, 30 to 35 percent of the workforce 
in 105 metropolitan areas, and 25 to 30 percent in 162 metropolitan areas. Id. at 206-
07. On the flip side, there is only one metro where the creative class makes up less 
than 20 percent of the workforce and 48 where it accounts for between 20 and 25 
percent of workforce. Id. The 11 regions where the creative class makes up more than 
40 percent of the workforce include San Jose, Silicon Valley, greater Washington D.C., 
and Boston; as well as smaller college towns such as Durham, Ithaca, Boulder, and 
Ann Arbor. Id. at 11, 206. The creative class is even more concentrated by county than 
by larger metro regions. Id. at 210-11; see also id. at 213-14 (distribution of creative 
class by skill/industry type), 218-19 (working class enclaves), and 222-23 (service 
class centers). 
 127 Id. at 232-33. 
 128 See id. at 245. See also Haifeng Qian et al., Regional Systems of Entrepreneurship: 
The Nexus of Human Capital, Knowledge, and New Firm Formation, 13 J. ECON. 
GEOGRAPHY 559, 560, 583 (2012) (reviewing studies finding positive relationship 
between human capital and start-up firms, and finding in their study that tolerance is 
a significant determinant of both human capital and new firm formation as it exerts 
the strongest total effect on entrepreneurship). 
 129 See, e.g., Edward L. Glaeser, The New Economics of Urban and Regional Growth, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC GEOGRAPHY 83-98 (2000) (firms will follow 
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to the growth of the “service class,” since the service economy is, in 
large measure, a response to the demands of the creative economy.130 
This multiplier effect from the growth of the creative class arguably 
makes these regions more economically resilient over the long term.131 
Florida has his share of critics,132 some of whom question the causal 
relationship between the presence of the creative class and economic 
growth.133 Nevertheless, many cities and counties have embraced 
economic development policies that provide cultural amenities and 
high levels of local service to attract and retain these mobile residents. 
Such approaches range from branding cities “creative” places134 to 
adopting tax increment financing and other development strategies 
that will attract creative firms to cities.135 Even more common are 
 
human capital to some degree, locating in areas of high human capital concentration 
to gain competitive advantages); Ric Kolenda & Cathy Yang Liu, Are Central Cities 
More Creative?: The Intrametropolitan Geography of Creative Industries, 34 J. URB. AFF. 
487, 506-08 (2012) (finding central cities host a greater share of creative industries 
and that creative jobs are more likely to be in central cities than other industries). 
 130 See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 47-48. Service workers are 
typically low-wage, low-autonomy occupations such as food-service workers, 
janitors/cleaners and groundskeepers, personal care attendants, secretaries and clerical 
workers, and security guards. Florida notes that the economic gap between these two 
classes underpins widening economic inequalities in America. There is also the 
traditional “working class,” which is in decline — by his estimates, down from 33 to 
26 million — and includes workers in production, transportation, repair and 
maintenance, and construction. Id. at 46-48. 
 131 See FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, supra note 102, at 50-51 (discussing studies 
showing the presence of a large creative class in a region lowering the unemployment 
rate); MORETTI, supra note 101, at 58-63 (noting that for every innovation job added, 
another five jobs are added to local service economy, three times the multiplier effect 
of manufacturing jobs). 
 132 These critics include Glaeser, who contends that Florida’s work is derivative of 
other human capital theories of economic development, including his own. Edward L. 
Glaeser, Review of Richard Florida’s The Rise of the Creative Class, CREATIVE CLASS 
GROUP 2 (2004), http://www.creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/GlaeserReview.pdf; see 
also Richard Florida, Response to Edward Glaeser’s Review of the Rise of the Creative 
Class, CREATIVE CLASS GROUP 2 (2004), http://creativeclass.com/rfcgdb/articles/ 
ResponsetoGlaeser.pdf.  
 133 See, e.g., Stephen Rausch & Cynthia Negrey, Does the Creative Engine Run? A 
Consideration of the Effect of Creative Class on Economic Strength and Growth, 28 J. URB. 
AFF. 473 (2006) (arguing that high human capital, high technology, culture, and 
immigration predict current and future growth). 
 134 For example, Austin, Texas proclaims itself a “creative city” where locally 
driven creativity and innovation thrive, notably the convergence of “music, film and 
gaming into a digital media sector” as well as “clean energy advances,” are the drivers 
of economic prosperity in the region. See Will Wynn, Creative Cities, 
http://www.willwynn.com/creative-cities/ (last visited Sept. 10, 2013). 
 135 See, e.g., David N. Cicilline, Creative Providence: A Cultural Plan for the Creative 
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cities that have targeted the development and cultivation of cultural 
amenities as part of their urban revitalization plans.136 There is 
evidence to suggest that these kinds of campaigns are working. 
Mobility patterns indicate that the educated, skilled, and talented class 
is disproportionately drawn to a small number of “cool” cities and 
have concentrated in those surrounding regions.137 
Edward Glaeser’s work on resurgent, large, dense metropolitan areas 
similarly underscores the role of regional amenities in attracting the 
kinds of high human capital and knowledge workers on which Florida 
has focused.138 Consider the transformation of the most “resurgent” 
 
Sector, CITY OF PROVIDENCE 12 (June 2009), http://www.providenceri.gov/ 
ArtCultureTourism/reports-publications (contemplating ways for the city to provide 
financial assistance to new start ups). 
 136 See, e.g., Mark J. Stern & Susan C. Seifert, Cultivating “Natural” Cultural 
Districts, THE REINVESTMENT FUND, PHILADELPHIA 1 (2007), http://www.trfund.com/wp-
content/uploads/2013/06/NaturalCulturalDistricts.pdf (arguing that clusters of 
cultural assets can lead to the revitalization of neighborhoods); see also Arthur Brooks 
& Roland Kushner, Cultural Districts and Urban Development, 3 INT’L J. ARTS MGMT. 4, 
4, 8 (2001) (surveying cities that have adopted special tax measures for cultural 
funding with the goal of urban renewal); Michael Rushton, Earmarked Taxes for the 
Arts: U.S. Experience and Policy Implications, 6 INT’L J. ARTS MGMT. 38, 38-48 (2004) 
(survey of earmarking of revenues for arts and culture in the local and state 
governments); Elizabeth Strom, Converting Pork into Porcelain: Cultural Institutions 
and Downtown Development, 38 URB. AFF. REV. 3, 3, 5 (2002) (noting that so many new 
facilities have been built in a relatively short time span and as part of an economic 
revitalization program). But not all places have had success. In November 2002, voters 
in metro Detroit’s Wayne and Oakland counties defeated a proposed property tax 
increase earmarked for arts and culture. Michael Rushton, Support for Earmarked 
Public Spending on Culture: Evidence from a Referendum in Metropolitan Detroit, 25 PUB. 
BUDGETING & FIN. 72, 72 (2005).  
 137 See, e.g., CEOS FOR CITIES, THE YOUNG AND RESTLESS IN A KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 1 
(2011), http://www.ceosforcities.org/research/the-young-and-restless-in-a-knowledge-
economy/ (noting that over the last decade urban centers have increasingly become 
the residential destination of choice for young college graduates); William Frey, Young 
Adults Choose “Cool Cities” During Recession, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1-2 (Oct. 28, 
2011), http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/up-front/posts/2011/10/28-young-adults-frey 
(noting that, to the extent they are moving, young adults are headed to metro areas 
which are known to have a certain vibe — college towns, high-tech centers, and so-
called “cool cities”). 
 138 These places have been undergoing a renaissance over the past few decades as 
places of consumption, not production. Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra 
note 89, at 1276. As the authors explain, evidence suggests that when cost of living is 
adjusted for, real wages have been falling in dense urban areas and are now lower in 
big cities than in small ones. Thus, urban resurgence is not primarily the result of 
rising urban productivity, and falling relative wages are better viewed as evidence of 
people’s increased desire to live in urban areas in part because of the increasing value 
they place on social amenities (reflected by rising prices in large metro areas, 
particularly dense ones, and the willingness to pay those prices). See id. at 1275-76, 
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urban metropolitan regions — those that surround cities such as New 
York, San Francisco, Boston, and Chicago. These regions and their 
core cities have a number of attributes in common. They have 
attracted successful industries that have done well in the information 
economy, have high levels of educated and skilled residents, and 
provide a rich set of consumption activities (theater, museum, 
restaurants), among other attributes.139 While the populations of these 
cities and regions have not grown considerably, in net terms, they 
have nevertheless been transformed by the mobility of high-income 
and high-skilled individuals into the region and the exodus of low 
human capital manufacturing from the region.140 
In contrast, many older, dense, urban regions surrounding cities, 
such as Detroit and St. Louis, have industries that have done poorly, 
have lower levels of highly educated and skilled workers, and few 
consumption advantages.141 These regions are being kept alive largely 
by long-lived housing stocks that are slowly depreciating. Cities like 
this, with less skilled workers, have suffered a dramatic urban 
decline.142 Some have bounced back, to be sure, and have done so 
through a strategy aimed at providing the type of amenities that attract 
the creative class. Pittsburgh’s remarkable renaissance over the past 
two decades is a telling example. After the steel industry collapse in 
the 1980s, Pittsburg halted what might have been an inevitable and 
unstoppable decline by pursuing an economic development strategy 
aimed at attracting high-tech industry, investing in large, regional-
scale arts institutions and sports venues, and transforming its old 
 
1281-83; see also Rappaport, Consumption, supra note 123, at 551 (finding that 
moderate differences in consumption amenities can cause large differences in 
population density and such amenities are more strongly capitalized into housing 
prices than wages); Jordan Rappaport, The Increasing Importance of Quality of Life, 9 J. 
ECON. GEOGRAPHY 779, 801 (2009) (finding strong relationship between local quality 
of life and relative urban population density).  
 139 Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 46; see also William Frey, 
Demographic Reversal: Cities Thrive, Suburbs Sputter, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 1-2 (June 
19, 2012) [hereinafter Demographic Reversal], http://www.brookings.edu/research/ 
opinions/2012/06/29-cities-suburbs-frey (noting that “core primary cities” such as 
Atlanta, Denver, and Washington, D.C. have been growing faster than their 
surrounding suburbs; what these core cities have in common are important urban 
amenities and economic bases that are attractive to young people and other 
households now clustering in their cities). 
 140 Glaeser et al., Consumer City, supra note 88, at 46. The same phenomenon also 
characterizes many European cities such as London, Paris and Barcelona. Id. 
 141 Id. at 47 (also noting the European counterparts to Detroit and St. Louis, such 
as Manchester, that similarly have lower levels of human capital and few consumption 
advantages). 
 142 Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42. 
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industrial area into an entertainment and shopping destination.143 
Moreover, many companies in the region today were formed from the 
intellectual capital concentrated in the Pittsburgh region’s twenty-five 
colleges and universities.144 The Pittsburgh region was rated one of the 
five best places for the “creative class,” among other accolades it has 
received in recent years.145 
This suggests that a particularly important subset of interregional 
movers is attuned to certain regional-scale amenities, including the 
regional human capital market (such as how many people have 
advanced degrees, the number and quality of universities in the 
region, and the like) and regional housing and job markets. These 
movers are also assessing and responding to regional-scale public 
goods, given that such public goods — the regional context of public 
services, regulatory environment, and tax burden — are indirectly 
reflected in regional amenities and regional markets. The argument 
that interregional residential movers in general, and high human 
capital individuals in particular, value regional-scale amenities may be 
somewhat inferential, but there is much logic to the proposition. 
 
 143 See Pittsburgh’s Renaissance, POPULAR PITTSBURGH 1-3, http://www.popularpittsburgh. 
com/pittsburgh-info/pittsburgh-history/renaissance.aspx (last visited Sept. 10, 2013) 
(recounting history of Pittsburg’s renaissance); see also Martin Prosperity Insights: Is Your 
Region . . . Creative, Innovative, Productive, . . . or Just Populated? MARTIN PROSPERITY 
INSTITUTE 1, 2 (2012), http://martinprosperity.org/media/MSA%20 Patents%20Insight_ 
v01.pdf. 
 144 Frank Giarratani et al., Dynamics of Growth and Restructuring in the Pittsburgh 
Metropolitan Region, UNIV. OF PITTSBURGH 12 (1999), http://www.briem.com/papers/ 
duisburg.PDF.  
 145 Pittsburgh’s Renaissance, supra note 143, at 1. Just as highly skilled, creative 
class types are migrating to metropolitan areas which offer them density, 
agglomeration knowledge economies, and consumption amenities, many other 
regional movers are sorting themselves into different metropolitan markets. These 
interregional movers are also attracted to regional-scale factors, but of a different 
nature than those that seem to appeal to creative class types. The factors at work in 
the densest urban regions, for example, do not seem to explain the rise of the 
“Sunbelt” metropolitan regions — which include cities such as Houston, Dallas, 
Atlanta, and Phoenix — characterized by high growth levels, moderate prices, and 
moderate incomes. Glaeser and Gottlieb’s explanation for the trend over the last few 
decades toward “sun and sprawl” is elastic housing supply due to abundant land, 
freeways, and pro-growth land use policy, rather than rising consumer amenity values 
or productivity. Glaeser & Gottlieb, Urban Resurgence, supra note 89, at 1284-85; 
Glaeser & Gottlieb, Wealth of Cities, supra note 106, at 998-99. Thus, the presence of 
these regional amenities (both natural and governmental) permitted those attracted to 
the region to satisfy their preferences for cheap suburban housing and a warm climate. 
Edward L. Glaeser & Kristina Tobio, The Rise of the Sunbelt, 74 S. ECON. J. 609, 641 
(2008). 
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3. Agglomeration, Amenities, and Interregional Mobility 
The distinction between the explanation for interregional mobility 
offered by agglomeration economics and the “amenities” approach 
represented most prominently by Florida has generated an ongoing 
debate.146 Both share a focus on mobility and what attracts high 
human capital individuals, but they differ on what draws this class to a 
particular locality or region, and thus what role policymakers can play 
in attracting them. The amenities approach is arguably consistent with 
a Tieboutian approach if local governments or metro regions see 
themselves as competing for this class of mobile residents by offering 
the kind of public goods that would attract educated, skilled, and 
creative residents. Agglomeration economies, however, more directly 
spring up as a market through individual location choices (albeit in a 
context influenced by local policies). Although it is possible to view 
agglomeration economies themselves as a local public good,147 such 
economies are not as clearly a direct product of government policy.148 
In fact, as David Schleicher has argued, there may be a tension 
between Tieboutian sorting and agglomeration effects in that local 
 
 146 See, e.g., Yong Chen & Stuart S. Rosenthal, Local Amenities and Life-Cycle 
Migration: Do People Move for Jobs or Fun?, 64 J. URB. ECON. 519 (2008) (1970–2000 
Census data indicates that cities with improving business environments acquire 
increasing shares of workers, especially with high human capital; cities with 
improving consumer amenities become relatively more populated by retirees; and that 
regardless of marital status, young, highly educated households tend to move towards 
places with higher quality business environments); Richard Florida et al., Inside the 
Black Box of Regional Development: Human Capital, the Creative Class and Tolerance, 8 
J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 615 (2008) (finding that “cultural economy” has both a direct 
and indirect relationship to regional development); Allen Scott, Jobs or Amenities? 
Destination Choices of Migrant Engineers in the USA, 89 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 43 
(2009) (finding that local employment opportunities and not amenities guide the 
migratory shifts of migrant engineers); Jesse M. Shapiro, Smart Cities: Quality of Life, 
Productivity, and the Growth Effects of Human Capital, 88 REV. ECON. & STAT. 324 
(2006) (concluding that roughly 60 percent of college graduates’ effect on 
employment growth is due to productivity, the rest from the concentrations of skill 
and growth in quality of life); Michael Storper & Allen J. Scott, Rethinking Human 
Capital, Creativity and Urban Growth, 9 J. ECON. GEOGRAPHY 147 (2009) (arguing that 
claims to the effect that consumers cities have now supplanted producer cities are 
greatly exaggerated). 
 147 Robert W. Helsley & William C. Strange, Matching and Agglomeration Economies 
in a System of Cities, 20 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 189, 189 (1990) (arguing that an 
agglomeration economy in the labor market has the characteristics of a local public 
good). 
 148 Cf. Charles J. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersections of Land Use Regulation, 
Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 813 (2012) 
(arguing that diversity “is clearly a public good in the Tieboutian sense”). 
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policies designed to attract mobile residents can interfere with the 
efficiency of location choices in an agglomerative model.149 Where 
mobile residents are tempted to move in response to local government 
policies, this creates incentives to give up “the lost transactions 
between people who would have lived near one another absent 
government intervention.”150 Moreover, Tieboutian localism 
empowers local land use policies that disfavor density in a way that 
pushes residents further apart from each other, discouraging beneficial 
local connections.151 Agglomeration economies exist beyond local 
government boundaries through various positive spillovers within a 
region, particularly knowledge spillovers.152 The existence of network 
externalities within a region, in which cities and towns are linked by 
transportation and telecommunication infrastructures that generate 
and diffuse knowledge, also cuts against a strong norm of Tieboutian 
localism.153 
Notwithstanding the tension between agglomeration economics and 
Tieboutian sorting, these two explanations are not necessarily 
independent of one another. Indeed, it is more likely that they exist in 
a fairly dynamic relationship. As Glaeser and Gottleib have argued, 
given the difficulty of estimating and measuring human capital 
externalities, even small changes in public policy can potentially have 
a significant effect on agglomeration economies.154 In other words, 
because agglomeration economies exist, local leaders will want to 
support and foster the conditions that help to produce and sustain 
them by offering the kinds of policies and amenities that are attractive 
to high human capital migrants. As one commentator put it, “[a] 
concentration of highly skilled workers will likely lead to the 
development of amenities as much as amenities drive the 
 
 149 See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1511-12, 1541 (explaining that “Tiebout sorting 
encourages individuals and businesses to scatter, moving around a metropolitan area 
away from where they would have located if local governments did not affect the 
market for property”). 
 150 Id. at 1512. 
 151 See Daniel B. Rodriguez & David Schleicher, The Location Market, 19 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 637, 645-46 (2012). 
 152 See, e.g., Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1544 (arguing that the policies of 
individual towns likely do not maximize the combined efficiency of agglomeration). 
 153 See Rafael Boix & Joan Trullén, Knowledge, Networks of Cities and Growth in 
Regional Urban Systems, 86 PAPERS IN REGIONAL SCI. 551, 555 (2007). 
 154 See Glaeser & Gottlieb, Wealth of Cities, supra note 106, at 1005, 1014-15 
(noting that the existence of human capital externalities does not suggest which 
policies will attract such workers, but does suggest that there are costs associated with 
policies that repel highly skilled workers, such as progressive taxation at the local 
level). 
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concentration of these same workers.”155 Even Schleicher 
acknowledges that there may be a role for government policy in 
helping to create the conditions for agglomeration economies, 
although he argues that it is best, for efficiency reasons, to leave such 
economies to the “location market.”156 
Finally, although contemporary human capital theories provide 
some evidence of regional-scale demand, the approach of such 
theories to mobility itself may seem in tension with the animating idea 
of Tiebout sorting. If people are moving for regional “amenities” or to 
capture the gains from proximity and breadth that agglomeration 
assumes, then they would not seem to be moving to satisfy their 
preferences for a mix of public goods and tax burden.157 But the reality 
is that many amenities commonly cited as motivating factors for 
mobility and many of the aspects of agglomeration that emphasize the 
density and diversity of inputs over immediate proximity are indirect 
reflections of the kinds of public goods at the heart of the Tiebout 
paradigm.158 Admittedly, there are important divergences in the 
consequences of each frame — particularly the proximity strand of 
agglomeration theory and traditional Tiebout sorting159 — but given 
that Tiebout sought to isolate the signal of public goods from the noise 
of the variety of motivations that actually drive mobility, the same 
kind of simplification can provide a bridge here as well. 
 
 155 W. Mark Brown & Darren M. Scott, Human Capital Location Choice: Accounting 
for Amenities and Thick Labour Markets, 52 J. REGIONAL SCI. 787, 789 (2012). 
 156 Rodriguez & Schleicher, supra note 151, at 639-40 (noting that governmental 
policies can improve on the decisions of individuals to cluster or sort into an 
agglomeration economy, but that such policies are difficult to devise given the high 
gains associated with choosing where to live and the ability of individuals to negotiate 
relatively effectively).  
 157 Tiebout, as noted, seemed to assume away motivations for residential moves at 
the heart of both the amenity and agglomeration approaches. See discussion supra Part 
I.A. 
 158 Cf. Malani, supra note 27 (discussing legal regimes as local amenities). For 
example, a regression analysis of Internal Revenue Service data found that six factors 
(climate variability, personal income taxes, private sector membership, housing prices, 
and public schools/education) account for two-thirds of the net migration among 
states from 2004–2008. Other than climate, these factors are all shaped by government 
policy. See W. Michael Cox & Richard Alm, Looking for the New New World, O’NEILL 
CTR. FOR GLOBAL MARKETS & FREEDOM, SMU COX SCH. OF BUS. 6, 10, 12, 17 (2010), 
http://oneildocs.cox.smu. edu/annualreports/2010oneilreport.pdf.  
 159 See Schleicher, supra note 3, at 1511. 
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III. TIEBOUTIAN REGIONALISM 
The phenomenon of interregional mobility has implications for the 
traditional link between Tieboutian sorting and localism. As this Part 
argues, if an important aspect of intergovernmental competition for 
mobile residents is regional in scale — in terms of the preferences that 
residents are seeking to satisfy and the institutions that can most 
appropriately respond — then the devolutionary apparatus of the 
Tiebout model can be inverted to support a range of regionalist 
arguments. This Part lays out these structural implications and then 
revisits the primary critiques of the Tiebout model for their variance in 
the context of interregional mobility. The Part concludes with 
reflections on the intersection of Tieboutian regionalism and the rise 
of international competition between increasingly global cities. 
A. Tiebout’s Regions 
1. Regional-Scale Demand as a Rationale for Regional Governance 
Contemporary patterns of interregional mobility are consonant with 
the idea that people are responding to regional-scale elements of 
demand as high human capital individuals increasingly sort 
themselves among a handful of core cities and their metropolitan 
areas. Growing regions are characterized by increases in highly skilled 
knowledge workers, income levels, and housing prices that are 
consistently and rapidly outpacing average national increases, due in 
part to limited housing supply.160 These regions tend to have 
important urban amenities attractive to highly skilled professionals 
and the creative class and many have made special efforts to attract 
and retain this critical subset of movers.161 
That a significant strand of contemporary residential mobility is 
being driven, at least in part, by demand for regional-scale public 
goods implies the need for a similar conceptual frame on the supply 
 
 160 MORETTI, supra note 101, at 13-14; Glaeser & Saiz, supra note 102, at 42; 
Florida, supra note 101. 
 161 See, e.g., Frey, Demographic Reversal, supra note 139 (based on analysis of 2010 
Census data, metropolitan areas with “core primary cities” saw rapid growth; city 
growth outpaced suburban growth in these areas); see also FLORIDA, RISE REVISITED, 
supra note 102, at 186 (finding that economic activity is concentrated in particular 
places that are growing bigger and bigger with the concentration of the creative class 
and that these cities do better than others at luring creative people to their 
environments by offering cultural amenties and a cultural climate that appeals to 
them). 
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side of the Tieboutian quasi-market.162 In other words, if the attraction 
for many mobile residents is not merely the governance of an 
immediate neighborhood, but rather a particular metropolitan context, 
then the relevant scale of the mix of public goods, regulatory 
environment, and tax burden reflected in that locational choice is in 
many important respects inherently regional.163 It is thus possible to 
think about regional governance as a supply-side phenomenon that 
responds to the particular demand of residents whose mobility is 
across metropolitan areas.164 
As noted, the universe of public goods that today’s regionally mobile 
residents find attractive include many types of outputs that are best 
supplied at regional scale. This holds true even if such residents are 
also attracted to public goods that have traditionally been thought of 
 
 162 Cf. Theodore Hershberg, The Case for Regional Cooperation, in FORMS OF LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT: A HANDBOOK ON CITY, COUNTY, AND REGIONAL OPTIONS 297, 297-98 
(Roger L. Kemp ed., 1999) (discussing interregional economic competition as a 
justification for regional cooperation). 
 163 Geographers and demographic scholars increasingly argue that the appropriate 
scale of regionalism is not metropolitan but, to use a term that sounds like it comes 
from an old science fiction movie, “megapolitan.” See ROBERT E. LANG & DAWN 
DHAVALE, METROPOLITAN INSTITUTE CENSUS REPORT SERIES, BEYOND MEGALOPOLIS: 
EXPLORING AMERICA’S NEW “MEGAPOLITAN” GEOGRAPHY 2 (2005); see also Margaret 
Dewar & David Epstein, Planning for “Megaregions” in the United States, 22 J. PLAN. 
LITERATURE 108, 110 (2007). In this view, economic, social, and environmental issues 
that have traditionally been the staple of metro-scale regionalism should now be 
filtered through a lens that recognizes that increasing urbanization is linking regions 
that span a much larger scale, such as the southern California conurbation, a Front 
Range urban area that stretches along I-25 from Cheyenne past Denver down to 
Pueblo, the greater Chicagoland region, southern Florida, the northeast Acela 
corridor, and a handful of others around the country. LANG & DHAVALE, supra, at 2. 
It is certainly possible that the mobility-based arguments for regionalism we explore 
in this Article could be applied to a level of governance one step more expansive than 
the metropolitan-scale regions on which we focus. See Richard J. Cebula & Usha Nair-
Reichert, Migration and Public Policies: A Further Empirical Analysis, 36 J. ECON. & FIN. 
238, 238 (2012) (finding evidence of Tieboutian sorting at the state level, with 
migrants appearing to prefer lower state income tax burdens, lower state plus local 
property tax burdens, and higher per pupil outlays on primary and secondary public 
education). But the paradigmatic mover this Article focuses on is an individual with 
greater sensitivity to local government policies than state-level policies. For present 
purposes, it is sufficient to recognize the centrifugal potential of mobility and bracket 
for now a fuller exploration of its application to larger-scale regions.  
 164 Cf. Briffault, Beyond City and Suburb, supra note 21, at 205 (“Cultural, 
educational, and health institutions — museums, orchestras, universities, and 
hospitals — serve their regions and play an important role in interregional 
competition. Infrastructure, environmental, and natural resource issues such as 
airports, transit systems, air and water quality, water supply, waste removal, and open 
space transcend local boundaries and affect interregional competition as well.”). 
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as local. The arts provide one example. In some regions across the 
country, major arts institutions and activities are funded and 
supported on a regional basis and serve as important regional markers 
of cultural identity.165 Similarly, major sports stadiums are increasingly 
being financed and maintained on a metropolitan regional basis.166 
Regional-scale public goods also encompass regulatory choices, such 
as tax incentives and economic development policies, that drive 
important aspects of regional labor and housing markets, and that can 
significantly influence the ecosystem in which innovation may occur. 
They also include regional institutions that foster an overall climate of 
growth, such as universities and regional health care facilities. 
Regional policy outputs also include the facilitation of amenities such 
as open space, regional transit, and other markers of the quality of 
urban life across a metropolitan area that attract the kind of mobile 
resident for whom many regions are competing. Though these public 
goods are not necessarily inherently regional, many, if not most, have 
important regional components; therefore, even where supplied by 
individual local governments, these goods may still be crucial to 
attract knowledgeable and creative mobile residents.167 
Beyond elevating the kinds of public goods that might garner local 
political attention, inter-metropolitan Tieboutian sorting can provide a 
new conceptual basis for regional governance beyond the traditional 
arguments well-rehearsed in the literature. Regionalism has long been 
 
 165 Some states and their metro regions, such as Missouri, Colorado, Minnesota, 
Kentucky, and Washington, have created cultural asset, or overlay, districts to fund 
regional scale institutions such as museums, theaters, and other cultural and civil 
institutions through sales taxes and tax incentives or credits. See generally VANDERBILT 
CTR. FOR NASHVILLE STUDIES, CULTURAL TAX DISTRICT: A REVIEW AND ANALYSIS OF 
CURRENT IMPLICATIONS (2010) (comparing cultural tax districts and non-tax 
alternative models). The designated boundaries of many of these districts include the 
central or core cities and the surrounding localities in the region; some were created 
in response to declining tax bases due to suburban flight even as those who fled the 
central city continued to use these regional assets. See Matthew Parlow, Equitable 
Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 82 (2012).  
 166 Parlow, supra note 165, at 83-84 (noting that Colorado, Louisiana, Arizona, and 
other states have passed statutes enabling and supporting the creation of sports 
stadium districts).  
 167 It has long been recognized that the reality of metropolitan service provision 
contains strong elements of collaboration and cooperation among local governments 
on some aspects of regional governance. See Elinor Ostrom & Robert B. Parks, Neither 
Gargantua nor the Land of the Lilliputs: Conjectures on Mixed Systems of Metropolitan 
Organization, in POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS FROM THE 
WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS 284, 285 (Michael D.McGinnis 
ed., 1999). 
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grounded in a series of basic propositions.168 First, regionalists argue 
that economies of scale suggest that a number of public goods that 
local governments now provide can be more efficiently produced at a 
higher level of governance.169 Second, and closely related, is the 
argument that the appropriate scale for many regulatory challenges is 
inherently regional. In essence, this argument holds that when the 
provision of certain goods involves regional watersheds, transportation 
networks, housing markets, or similar concerns that require collective 
action at a regional scale, the scope of governance should match the 
scope of the regulatory concern.170 Indeed, because there is empirical 
support for a strong relationship between core-city and regional 
income and poverty,171 economic development policy and regulatory 
authority in these areas have inherently regional aspects. Finally, for 
commentators and scholars concerned with the capacity of local 
governments to respond to inequity, regionalism has been a means to 
overcome the artificial constraints of local government structure by 
limiting a variety of welfare-enhancing transfers between localities.172 
Tieboutian sorting at the level of metropolitan areas provides an 
argument for regionalism that is distinct from these traditional 
rationales, albeit reflecting some of the elements of the argument from 
interdependence. Rather than focusing on the inherent scope of 
common regional concerns, economies of scale, or communitarian or 
regional equity arguments, positing a “quasi-marketplace” between 
metropolitan regions privileges the shared imperative of all local 
governments in a region to facilitate collective competitiveness. While 
concerns of community, accountability, and efficiency might parse out 
toward localism or regionalism depending on the existence of 
interlocal spillovers and the like, regional-level mobility offers an 
independent, direct argument for regional governance. If residents 
 
 168 See Laurie Reynolds, Local Governments and Regional Governance, 39 URB. LAW. 
483, 489-90 (2007). 
 169 See id. at 490-91. 
 170 See id. at 498.  
 171 Manuel Pastor and his co-authors, for example, have found a negative 
relationship between concentrated poverty and regional income growth. See MANUEL 
PASTOR JR., PETER DREIER, J. EUGENE GRIGSBY III & MARTA LÓPEZ-GARZA, REGIONS THAT 
WORK: HOW CITIES AND SUBURBS CAN GROW TOGETHER 13 (2000). Another study 
examined decades of data for over 250 metropolitan statistical areas and found a 
strong relationship for cities and their suburbs in terms of levels and growth of 
population, income, and home values. Andrew Haughwout & Robert Inman, Should 
Suburbs Help Their Central City?, BROOKINGS-WHARTON PAPERS ON URB. AFF. 45, 47, 55 
(2002). 
 172 See Reynolds, supra note 168, at 493. As Professor Reynolds notes, there is also 
an argument for regionalism from democratic participation grounds. Id. at 492-93. 
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evaluating interregional moves are looking to, and attracted by, 
regional-scale amenities and the regional ecosystem for agglomeration, 
then some form of regional governance or collective action more often 
than not seems necessary to provide such goods. 
As a practical matter, it is more difficult to operationalize Tieboutian 
regionalism to meet inter-metropolitan demand through regional-scale 
public goods than traditional localism. Indeed, it is possible to 
analogize the relevant regional-scale “supply” of the relevant bundles 
of public goods, regulation, and taxation, which, again, may come 
from multiple local governments, to the production of other outputs 
that likewise require assembly. One way to think about the practical 
barriers to that collective action, which is to say to some form of 
regional governance, is through the lens of the so-called 
“anticommons.” Michael Heller has argued that fragmentation of 
rights may cause the supply of a variety of goods — public and private 
— to be sub-optimal.173 According to Heller, and modeled more 
formally in economics literature,174 when multiple rights holders have 
the ability to block coordination, whether through the exercise of a 
fractional owner’s right to exclude in property or through similar veto 
powers, resources can be undersupplied.175 
Although primarily focused on property law, Heller has applied this 
theory to governance challenges, such as the over-proliferation of 
tollbooths on the Rhine River and fragmented authority in the 
issuance of urban building permits.176 The same conceptual frame can 
explain why regional-scale goods are generally under-supplied in the 
Tieboutian localism framework.177 Local governments in a 
metropolitan region are empowered by the basic structure of state law 
 
 173 See generally MICHAEL HELLER, THE GRIDLOCK ECONOMY: HOW TOO MUCH 
OWNERSHIP WRECKS MARKETS, STOPS INNOVATION, AND COSTS LIVES (2008) (arguing that 
fragmentation of rights may result in wasteful underuse of resources). 
 174 James M. Buchanan & Yong J. Yoon, Symmetric Tragedies: Commons and 
Anticommons, 43 J. L. & ECON. 1, 1 (2000); Francesco Parisi, Norbert Schulz & Ben 
Depoorter, Fragmentation in Property: Towards a General Model, 159 J. INST. & 
THEORETICAL ECON. 594, 594 (2003). 
 175 HELLER, supra note 173, at 18. As Heller notes, fragmentation of rights can also 
be a beneficial source of protection for scarce resources. Id. at 67. 
 176 Id. at 3, 20-21, 109-10. 
 177 A few scholars have made this connection, albeit through the lens of the more 
commonly discussed tragedy of the commons, rather than explicitly approaching 
regionalism failures as an example of an anticommons. See, e.g., Buzbee, supra note 
60, at 8-36 (arguing that regulatory commons problems can arise outside the common 
pool resource setting). It is clearer to think of this as an anticommons problem, as 
there are competing rights that operate as vetoes, if regional-scale demand is the 
conceptual baseline. 
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to exercise a kind of direct veto right — the right to secede from 
involvement in regional-scale governance. To the extent that factors 
external to the state-created structure of local governments might 
suggest the need for a regional approach (and in this Article we focus 
on regional-scale demand by mobile residents as one particular 
external driver of governance scale), state-granted veto rights can just 
as paradigmatically yield under-production as any other kind of legal 
fragmentation. All of this underscores the practical challenge of 
implementing a regional-scale response to comparative metropolitan 
demand, but does not undermine the imperative to do so.178 
2. Interregional Localists? 
One counterargument to the proposition that regional-scale mobile 
demand has implications for the supply of Tieboutian bundles through 
regional-scale governance is that, theoretically, it would be possible 
for traditional local competition to satisfy regional demand most 
optimally. Thus, even if a mobile resident is evaluating the greater 
Atlanta metro area against the Miami-Dade metro region, once that 
person decides to move, they still have to make an intraregional choice 
of residence (and work, and school) and that traditional choice then 
generates the traditional Tieboutian argument for localism.179 
Moreover, people moving from one metropolitan area to another may 
have an affirmative attraction to devolution itself as a public good if 
they believe that their specific policy preferences are best supplied by 
fragmented, relatively exclusionary local governments within the 
region to which they are relocating.180 
 
 178 To be clear, our argument is not that interregional mobility undermines the 
process of Tiebout sorting as it has been traditionally invoked by legal scholars. 
Rather, it is that a balance must be recognized between types of mobility that 
conceptually support devolution and an increasingly important strain of mobility that 
can conceptually support regionalism. These are not mutually exclusive and the real 
question is the balance in any given instance. 
 179 Indeed, there is evidence that some mobile residents move outside of their 
region to find the ideal package of localized public policies, services, and taxes. See, 
e.g., Martin Farnham & Purvi Sevak, State Fiscal Institutions and Empty-Nest Migration: 
Are Tiebout Voters Hobbled?, 90 J. PUB. ECON. 407 (2006) (fiscal adjustment among 
cross-state movers suggests that, given the opportunity, households will choose 
communities that offer a tax and service bundle suited to their demands even across 
state lines).  
 180 Cf. Malani, supra note 27 (discussing legal structures as amenities). Thus, if a 
person believes that public schools operate best at the most local level, the fact that a 
region has multi-jurisdictional (and particularly center-city and suburb-spanning) 
school districts would be an affirmative disincentive to move to that region compared 
to a region that privileged localism in schools. 
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This is a serious proposition, and we are not assuming that even the 
most die-hard regionalist will ignore intraregional differences when 
making their ultimate locational choice.181 Indeed, once residents 
decide to move to a region it is very likely that they will compare the 
region’s constituent counties and municipalities to find the right 
package of local goods and taxes. Notwithstanding the likelihood of 
Tieboutian sorting in interregional moves, our point is that such 
moves reflect a balance between the influence of purely local public 
goods and the kinds of regional-scale public goods that attract 
interregional movers in the first place. Both must be considered when 
evaluating the structural consequences of mobility on governance. 
In practice, moreover, it is very difficult to test the traditional 
Tiebout hypothesis on an interregional basis without controlling for 
differences in regional labor markets and regional amenities that are 
not within the control of any one local government unit.182 Because 
localities within a metropolitan region tend to be socially and 
economically interdependent, interregional mobility patterns have an 
inherent tendency to reflect regional goods and amenities. As such, 
when mobile residents migrate from one region to another, it is as 
important to examine the mix of regional public goods, services, and 
amenities as it is to look at the particular mix of locally-bounded 
public goods and services within the region. 
On the supply side, it is an empirical question as well whether 
regional governance is actually responding to regional demand. Unlike 
Tieboutian localism, significant empirical work — direct or indirect — 
has not been done on issues such as comparative capitalization rates 
and the other indicia of the effect of sorting at the regional level.183 
There is a second-order indication that regional sorting may have the 
 
 181 Although information costs are undoubtedly higher for residents when 
Tieboutian competition is interregional, these costs have been reduced considerably 
with modern technology. See, e.g., Kaplan & Schulhofer-Wohl, supra note 114 
(finding costs of information about job opportunities has decreased over time, 
contributing to some flattening out of interstate mobility rates between 1991 and 
2011).  
 182 Georg Grassmueck, What Drives Intra-county Migration: The Impact of Local 
Fiscal Factors on Tiebout Sorting, 41 REV. REGIONAL STUD. 119, 121-22 (2011) (citing 
studies which attempt to test for Tieboutian interregional sorting and noting that 
intraregional testing is more accurate because the “independence from regional labor 
markets and regional natural amenities allows the researcher to focus on the 
differences at the local level, such as local taxes, expenditures, housing, and schooling, 
testing a Tiebout-like mechanism at work”). 
 183 See supra note 20 (on the empirics of Tieboutian sorting at the local level); cf. 
Farnham & Sevak, supra note 179 (noting evidence of interregional local preference 
satisfaction). 
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same kind of impact on property valuation that local sorting seems to 
have, given the comparative variation of property values among 
metropolitan areas.184 
Moreover, it is not entirely clear that local government officials are 
necessarily aware of, or directly attending to, demand for regional-
scale public goods in a Tieboutian marketplace. There is certainly 
anecdotal evidence of this in explicitly regional efforts to attract 
talent,185 and this has become a more important (if often implicit) 
aspect of regionalism arguments in the popular literature.186 But the 
logic inherent in sorting should provide an incentive for local 
government officials to do just that.187 
3. Inverting Tieboutian Localism 
To shift from theory to doctrine, Tieboutian regionalism has 
implications for several core debates in local government law. As 
noted, Tieboutian sorting has long been invoked in opposition to 
regionalism in the legal literature.188 However, a Tieboutian 
perspective on regional mobility, while not necessarily generating any 
specific prescription for governance at a regional scale, provides a 
new, and in this context, perhaps ironic, justification for a range of 
supply-side governance responses to regional demand. This regional-
scale supply could embrace everything from traditional metropolitan 
consolidation to special-purpose regional entities, such as arts overlay 
 
 184 Cf. David Albouy & Gabriel Ehrlich, Metropolitan Land Values and Housing 
Productivity 14 & tbl.2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18110, 
2012), available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~albouy/ Land/l andvalues.pdf 
(noting the variability in land value by metropolitan region). 
 185 See sources cited supra note 11. 
 186 See sources cited supra note 13. 
 187 Much of the literature on Tiebout emphasizes entrance, which is to say 
attracting new residents, but in a competitive environment, governance is also 
influenced by the threat of exit. Policies might theoretically vary if a region (or local 
government) is trying to keep a current resident than attract a new resident, although 
arguments about the kinds of environments that attract high human capital workers in 
particular tend to dovetail with what keeps those people in a given place once they 
relocate. 
 188 In the legal literature, the typical juxtaposition has been between Tieboutian 
localism and regionalism. See, e.g., Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling 
Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 143, 173 (2010) (arguing that regionalism 
“diminishes the potential for useful interlocal variation and competition along the 
lines suggested by the Tiebout hypothesis”); Edward J. Huck, Tiebout or Samuelson: 
The 21st Century Deserves More, 88 MARQ. L. REV. 185 (2004) (contrasting Tieboutian 
localism with a kind of regional consolidation approach associated with Paul 
Samuelson’s work in public finance). 
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districts, to the kind of intraregional local cooperation that Clayton 
Gillette has highlighted.189 
To begin, responding to regional demand requires greater 
cooperation and coordination on the regional supply side.190 As such, 
interregional competition for mobile residents might justify creating 
more legal room for moderating the formal aspects of state and local 
government law that can stand as impediments to regional action. At 
the same time, as David Barron has argued, there may be areas where 
local government authority can be strengthened to foster the capacity 
for regional undertakings.191 This rebalancing is a matter in the first 
instance for state legislative reform, but can also play out in doctrinal 
conflicts involving local government authority as well as invocations 
of home-rule immunity in the face of contrary state-level directives or 
preemption.192 
In doctrinal areas that shape local government practice — which can 
involve questions of taxation, regulatory authority, service provision, 
and other staples of local government law193 — interregional 
competition does not inherently undermine mobility-based arguments 
for devolution. But it does provide a rationale for state-level efforts to 
promote regionalism and judicial recognition of the necessity, in some 
contexts, to cede local authority to regional concerns. Courts often 
balance a range of normative considerations in evaluating the balance 
between local government authority and efforts to moderate the 
consequences of local parochialism, whether in terms of immediate 
externalities or in terms of regional-scale problems.194 The dynamics of 
 
 189 See infra text accompanying notes 198-199. 
 190 See supra text accompanying notes 173-177. 
 191 David Barron, Reclaiming Home Rule, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2255, 2352-62 (2003) 
(discussing antidiscrimination and inclusionary zoning as examples); see also 
Reynolds, supra note 168, at 524-28 (discussing ways that strengthening localism 
might facilitate regionalism). 
 192 Cf. Barron, supra note 191, at 2367 (noting that the range of options available to 
local governments “is a function not only of the powers that state law confers upon it 
in isolation, but also of the powers that state law confers upon its neighbors”). 
 193 Among the areas where the scope of local authority — often in the face of 
contrary regional-scale alternatives — is most salient are land use, education, taxation, 
and the structure and operation of local governments themselves. See, e.g., Briffault, 
Our Localism, supra note 2, at 346 (stating that local autonomy is critical in shaping 
the law of school funding, land use, and local government formation and 
preservation). 
 194 See, e.g., Ashira Pelman Ostrow, Process Preemption in Federal Siting Regimes, 48 
HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 289, 298-99 (2011) (discussing local authority over land use 
regulation as a barrier to responding to regional needs); see also Nestor M. Davidson, 
Cooperative Localism: Federal-Local Collaboration in an Era of State Sovereignty, 93 VA. 
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interregional competition may provide an additional factor for courts 
to evaluate in that balance. 
Tieboutian regionalism also provides an argument, albeit perhaps at 
the margins, for reducing barriers to municipal annexation and for 
caution when it comes to the relative ease of municipal incorporation. 
The jurisprudence of local boundary setting has long been recognized 
as a core ground for debates about localism,195 with legal scholars 
recognizing that the legal construction of authority over city-county 
consolidation, annexation, secession, dissolution, and other questions 
of local government entity formation and definition play an important 
role in the scale of governance.196 In all of these areas, the reality of 
interregional competition for mobile residents underscores doctrines 
that facilitate regional scale and impede the erection of institutional 
barriers to regional governance.197 
Beyond these particular legal-structural implications, regional 
mobility can help facilitate collaboration by local governments within 
a metropolitan area. Clayton Gillette has argued that local 
governments have under-appreciated incentives to cooperate on a host 
of issues.198 To Gillette, the relative lack of interlocal cooperation is 
 
L. REV. 959, 1024 (2007) (noting that a variety of local decisions “have external effects 
on neighboring communities, shaping regional economies without any imperative that 
the extraterritorial consequences of local decision-making be taken into account”). 
 195 See, e.g., Briffault, The Local Government, supra note 3 (proposing a weakening 
of the significance of local boundries coupled with the creation of regional 
governments); Richard Thompson Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in 
Legal Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1841 (1994) (noting that jurists and legal scholars 
simultaneously refer to local boundries as arbitrary while treating local governments 
as sacrosanct entitites).  
 196 See Michelle Wilde Anderson, Dissolving Cities, 121 YALE L.J. 1364, 1369, 1419-
28, 1432 (2012) (noting that municipal dissolutions, in which cities dissolve into 
county structures in times of economic crisis and population loss, offer a way to 
“achieve progressive modernization of local government law by reducing local 
fragmentation, and, in particular, by eliminating separate governments for areas that 
are too small to sustain them efficiently”). 
 197 Thus, interregional competition might be invoked as a ground for consolidation 
or other techniques to provide platforms for scaling up or combining local 
governments. It is true that there is relatively little practical support for most broad-
scale efforts at formal regionalism, as opposed to regional governance, but the ease or 
difficulty of managing even small-scale efforts to revisit the scale of interlocal 
boundaries can make a difference. 
 198 See, e.g., Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 190 (2001) [hereinafter Regionalization] (arguing that the interdependence of 
localities provides an incentive to cooperate through interlocal contracts); Clayton P. 
Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Competition, 21 J.L. & POL. 365 (2005) (arguing 
that localities should be willing to work together in order to create spillover benefits 
or avoid negative externalities). 
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less a function of local parochialism and more a function of the high 
transaction costs associated with current institutional structures, 
particularly high contracting costs.199 Accepting this frame, 
interregional competition may change the cost-benefit analysis that 
any local government might undertake when assessing the relative 
merits of interlocal cooperation versus a defection strategy, raising the 
potential benefits even if not necessarily changing the costs. The 
results, regardless, should be greater interlocal cooperation, all other 
factors held equal. 
In short, Tieboutian regionalism has implications for the entire legal 
discourse on localism: it supports a version of home rule that is more 
attentive to regional spillover effects, bolsters doctrines on 
jurisdictional borders that make consolidation less costly (looser 
annexation rules as well as lower legal barriers for small cities to 
dissolve), and provides a new rationale for facilitating intraregional 
bargaining and agreements that capture economies of scale.200 These 
are not new doctrinal frames, but all merit revisiting through an 
alternative rationale for familiar regionalist governance 
prescriptions.201 
B. Revisiting the Critiques 
The concerns that Tieboutian localism has drawn from a number of 
scholars, both in terms of the internal operation of the model and its 
consequences,202 have parallels and important disjunctions when the 
mobility-governance link is regional. Some of these concerns may be 
muted, but others may only be reinforced or even exacerbated in the 
 
 199 See Gillette, Regionalization, supra note 198, at 254. 
 200 Here, again, a counterargument might be offered that demand for regional 
public goods by residents moving between metropolitan areas might as easily be 
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context of mobility-based regionalism. This section addresses the 
extent to which concerns about the use of the Tiebout model in local 
governance scale up. 
1. Internal Critiques 
Critiques that focus on the basic mechanisms of Tiebout sorting, 
such as the implausibility of mobility actually changing the political 
process, the information barriers to “consumer-voting,” and the like, 
at first blush seem equally likely to hold for regional-scale locational 
choices as they do for a localist quasi-marketplace.203 There are 
certainly aspects of regional-scale mobility that may render the model 
less plausible at an interregional scale. For example, interregional 
moves arguably entail much higher information costs compared to 
interlocal moves, making the ability to sort based on public goods less 
plausible. An argument for the centrifugal force of interregional 
mobility is thus not likely to convince scholars inclined to argue that 
the noise of alternative motivations for locational choices will drown 
out the signal offered by the bundle of public goods. And the reality 
that, absent full regional consolidation, the link between governance 
and place is inherently more attenuated in the institutional structure 
of regionalism makes the argument about political mechanisms for 
responding to mobility more challenging in the interregional context. 
We acknowledge these additional complications to the model, but 
still argue that the basic mechanism can translate to regional scale. 
Our aim here is not to plow new conceptual ground about the 
processes underlying the influence of mobility on governance, many of 
which are strained at the purely local level to begin with. Rather, we 
assume for the sake of argument that the basic conceptual framework 
has merit (and, if nothing else, it certainly has great influence). 
Accordingly, we accept that the mechanics are sufficiently similar — 
even for the differences in degree on some measures of how mobility 
influences governance — but vary the model’s assumptions about the 
scale of the demand for and supply of public goods and their resulting 
prescriptions. 
2. Consequentialist Critiques 
As to the more pernicious consequences of mobility’s influence on 
governance itself, a Tieboutian perspective on regionalism has the 
potential to both mute and exacerbate disparate elements of the 
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distributional and the commodification concerns.204 To begin, it is 
possible that regional mobility’s counterbalance to the devolutionary 
tendencies of the traditional mobility paradigm might mitigate the 
dynamics of regional inequity. The argument would be that the more 
regional mobility reinforces regional identity and shared governance, 
the stronger the incentive to recognize the shared fate of disparate 
communities in a given region, and the greater the likelihood of 
recognizing that regional inequality is a drag on regional growth. 
Further, it appears that policies that promote sustainability and 
regional equity are themselves selling points for “creative class” 
knowledge workers attracted to regions of relative cultural 
tolerance.205 This dynamic can thus reinforce local policies that seek to 
respond to regional inequality. Because interlocal collaboration has the 
potential to resolve fiscal disparities and other intraregional inequities, 
the openness of the creative class to viewing more equitable regional 
policies as in the region’s collective best-interest has the potential to 
disrupt “the nativism amongst residents of [discrete geographic 
communities] that precludes the pursuit of cross-border political 
alliances.”206 
At the same time, intraregional disparities may be exacerbated if 
interregionally mobile residents care most about cherry-picking a 
region’s advantages. This harkens back to the concern that 
interregional movers may revert to traditional Tieboutian sorting once 
inside the region. That is, mobile residents may end up choosing one 
metropolitan region over another because of its collective advantages, 
but then make second-order intraregional locational decisions based 
on factors that replicate the current dynamics that have given rise to 
the inequitable patterns existing in many regions today. It is difficult 
to determine empirically which of these two outcomes is more likely 
to occur and we admit to misgivings about the ability of any model 
based on a quasi-market sorting mechanism to solve the very 
distributional problems that it creates. Nevertheless, intuitively, 
regional-scale mobility can at least offer a counterweight to the more 
parochial aspects of localism by fostering a sense of common destiny 
among disparate interests linked by a concern for overall regional 
health and competitiveness. 
Taking a step back, interregional sorting may also replicate the 
kinds of spatial distributional problems associated with Tieboutian 
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localism, but instead among metropolitan regions rather than within 
them, like fractals that replicate structures at varying scales.207 There is 
some evidence that metropolitan regions are, in fact, developing at 
rates that suggest a kind of regional-scale tiering.208 The industrial 
midwest, for example, has regions that, as a whole, are shrinking and 
losing not just populace, but also economic and governmental 
resources; while regions in the south, southwest, and northeast have 
seen relatively greater growth, even through the downturn.209 This 
risks a kind of “favored quarter” at an interregional rather than 
interlocal level — all the more so because contemporary mobility 
between metropolitan areas is dominated by highly skilled people with 
high human capital. 
In terms of commodification, regional mobility does not mitigate — 
and arguably reinforces — the concern that mobility paradigms reduce 
local governance too much to a transactional emphasis on returns on 
investment rather than shared community. Concerns about the risks 
posed by an emphasis on intergovernmental competition and market-
like mechanisms for governance could easily be replicated at the 
regional scale. Indeed, the focus of regional entities or collaborations 
on targeting mobile knowledge workers in order to stimulate 
innovation-related growth is arguably just a modern twist on the kind 
of governance-as-marketplace that has concerned so many legal 
scholars about the Tiebout model’s influence on the nature of local 
government.210 The fact, moreover, that local governments are 
competing less for traditional industrial and blue-collar industrial 
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goods and more for high human capital workers, regardless of scale, 
carries a particular risk of commodification that makes it hard for 
certain “consumers” in the market for local public goods to influence 
governance. 
On the other hand, even if mobile innovators are particularly 
“market” oriented in their response to locational choice, there is an 
argument that the kinds of regional-scale policies that are thought to 
attract these particular residents may have spillover effects that 
reinforce, rather than undermine, community character and livability. 
As noted, regional-scale amenities such as vibrant cultural 
environments, tolerant and racially diverse local cultures, and 
ecosystems of innovation seem to be attractive to the most prominent 
of interregional mobile residents.211 These may, in turn, generate 
greater civic engagement, as people across a region have more 
opportunities to engage across sub-communities and interact in public 
spaces and environments that foster common identity and purpose.212 
C. Coda: Regional Mobility in a World of Global Cities 
To this point, our discussion has focused on the reality that the 
metropolitan regional scale in the United States is an important locus 
for interjurisdictional competition for mobile residents. But the 
contest for human capital is also increasingly occurring among 
metropolitan regions internationally.213 
Saskia Sassen has persuasively argued that the world economy has 
given rise to the dominance of “global cities,” which she defines not 
simply as particularly large or important cities, but rather as 
interconnected nodes of post-industrial economic activity.214 Sassen 
describes a contemporary economic system that is “spatially dispersed, 
yet globally integrated,”215 with a core of large cities (and the metro 
regions in which they exist) increasingly serving as points of economic 
concentration, particularly in high human capital sectors such as 
finance.216 Sassen focused on three examples — New York, London, 
and Tokyo (she was originally writing in 1991) — but the 
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phenomenon she describes applies today to a large array of urban 
regions, including those in rapidly urbanizing areas of China, India, 
Brazil, and other similar developing nations.217 
The post-industrial, interconnected urban order that Sassen 
describes reflects and magnifies the kind of metropolitan interregional 
competition that is occurring domestically.218 Greater New York (or 
Chicagoland, or the San Francisco Bay Area, or really most of the 
larger metropolitan regions in the United States) now have to pay 
attention to comparisons in metropolitan financial markets, urban 
planning, housing conditions, school quality, and amenities in 
Shanghai, Bangalore, Sao Paolo, Tel Aviv, and similar interconnected 
economic areas around the world that, even in the current global 
downturn, are still booming.219 
If the world is moving to a global economy increasingly driven by 
knowledge workers competing at the metropolitan level against other 
metro-level engines of innovation,220 then competition for this global 
talent lends further support to inversion of the devolutionary 
prescriptions of the traditional Tieboutian paradigm.221 Gerald Frug 
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and David Barron have argued that state law — by alternately granting 
and limiting local authority — distorts the ability of cities such as New 
York that might be inclined to compete with other global cities.222 The 
same argument can pertain to regional-scale governance, perhaps even 
more clearly given the muddle that currently attends to legal authority 
for regional efforts and the tradition and history of localism. 
The legal-structural consequences of the proliferation of global cities 
as drivers of economic growth — and participants in the competition 
for mobile human capital — in turn suggests other pathways for future 
research. For example, global competition at a metropolitan regional 
scale may have implications not only for local government law, but 
also for immigration. In a recent, provocative proposal, the economist 
Brandon Fuller made the argument for city-based visas.223 As Fuller 
noted, localities have different preferences — a Tieboutian argument 
— for increased immigration, and those that prefer to attract 
immigrants could be given a certain number of visas from the 
Department of Homeland Security to enable them to sponsor visa 
holders and their families.224 The sponsoring localities would be 
responsible for the immigrants (to allay concerns — however 
irrational — about immigrants taking advantage of transfer programs 
and increasing crime) and this could create a path to citizenship.225 
This is not to endorse the proposal, which raises concerns about risks 
to national uniformity, but simply to note that a global perspective on 
interregional competition may have intriguing legal consequences. 
CONCLUSION: THE VIEW FROM TIEBOUT’S BEACH 
Over sixty years ago, Charles Tiebout described a simple beach as 
the paradigm example of a local amenity that might be important in 
the quasi-market for mobile residents in which he imagined local 
 
interregional competition — nationally and globally — could still be considered 
somewhat devolutionary, in the sense that the theory privileges metropolitan scale and 
hence regional governance, rather than, for example, state-level or national 
policymaking. Cf. Pettys, supra note 2 (discussing arguments for national-level 
lawmaking in the face of mobility). The theory thus invokes mobility to situate 
policymaking at a relatively low level in the federalism hierarchy, although some 
metropolitan areas are functionally larger than some states. 
 222 See FRUG & BARRON, supra note 213, at 153. 
 223 Brandon Fuller, City-Based Visas, URBANIZATION PROJECT (Aug. 1, 2012) 
[hereinafter City-Based Visas], http://urbanizationproject.org/blog/city-based-visas/; 
Brandon Fuller, More on City-Based Visas, URBANIZATION PROJECT (Aug. 9, 2012), 
http://urbanizationproject.org/blog/more-on-city-based-visas/.  
 224 Fuller, City-Based Visas, supra note 223. 
 225 Id. 
  
120 University of California, Davis [Vol. 47:63 
governments competing.226 In an era of regional mobility between 
metropolitan areas across the country — and, for some residents, 
around the world — the view from Tiebout’s beach now looks very 
different. Today, public officials in metropolitan areas are increasingly 
realizing that they share a common fate, not for the traditional reasons 
that regionalists have long proffered for collaboration, but because 
they are increasingly aware of the reality of competition between 
regions for human capital. Concerns about equity and the signals that 
a marketplace metaphor holds for governance remain as valid as ever, 
if not more so. But there is no avoiding the reality that for many 
mobile residents, their locational choice is informed materially by the 
comparative merits of regional networks and regulatory environments, 
regional amenities, and regional job, housing, and investment 
ecosystems. Local governments ignore this reality at their peril, as do 
scholars who continue to associate Tieboutian sorting entirely with 
devolution and decentralization. 
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